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ABSRACT 
The right of an accused to a fair and just trial is as universal as it is absolute. Save for instances 
where there is a shift of evidential burden, an accused cannot be compelled to provide evidence 
in proof of their innocence. The sole bearer of the burden of proof is the prosecution which has 
to establish the guilt of an accused beyond a shadow of doubt. In fact, the prosecution is strictly 
obligated to not only facilitate the accused in their defence but to also make disclosures of all 
evidentiary discoveries irrespective of whether inculpatory or exculpatory. This strict 
obligation is aimed at remedying the undeniable imbalance of power between the state and the 
accused and while at face value my seem unfair, is functionally sound. Nonetheless, the 
application of the right of an accused to a fair trial including access to evidence and potential 
witnesses must be undertaken within the context of several supervening factors. These include, 
among others, safety of witnesses, confidentiality of materially proprietary information as well 
as national security. 
Of concern to this study is safety of witnesses. Discovery must take into account the possible 
implications of disclosure of personal information of witnesses. This evaluation must be done 
on case by case basis. Effectiveness of a criminal trial process is thus determined on the basis 
of the balance of concerns of the state, victims and the accused. This study evaluates the 
application of these principles in Kenya. It evaluates the role of the prosecution on disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence, the right to fair trial by interrogating the interplay between the right 
of accused to discovery and the need to protect witnesses from potential harm on account of 
such disclosures. The research proceeds against a background that a majority of criminal cases 
in Kenya often overvalue the right of an accused to full evidentiary disclosure while 
increasingly paying little attention to the implications of the same, more so on the safety of 
witnesses. Domestic practice demonstrates that the only realm where witness protection seems 
to matter and reigns almost absolute is in sexual offences involving minors. The inconsistencies 
in the application of the principle of fairness brings to the fore the question as to the existing 
domestic legal instruments are sufficiently equipped at safeguarding the right of an accused to 
fair trial while at the same time guaranteeing safety of witnesses. To achieve this, the research 
conducts a qualitative systematic literature review in examining the role of the prosecutor and 
looking beyond the domestic practice to identify potential lessons Kenya can learn to 
streamline its approach. The study looks into the application of this interplay in major global 
legal platforms including the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The study is based on Aristotle’s theory of justice specifically distributive justice with 
an aim of seeking a balance for all parties involved in the criminal justice system.  
The findings indicate that, in Kenya, as in the international criminal trial platforms, application 
of evidentiary rules is rather loose, and the determination as to what amounts to witness safety 
concern or a violation of evidentiary disclosure obligations is purely discretionary. This implies 
the right of accused to disclosure may be violated without dire consequences to the prosecution 
while at the same time; the safety of witnesses may be compromised much to the disadvantage 
of the trial process.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.0 Introduction 
Exculpatory evidence refers to any relevant material that “creates a reasonable doubt that did 
not otherwise exist”.1 It has also been defined to refer to evidence such as a pronouncement or 
a testimony, inclined to absolve, justify or excuse an alleged guilt or fault of an accused.2 
According to the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP), prosecutors have the duty to 
conduct themselves professionally. The IAP guidelines specifically outline that professional 
conduct includes the duty to “always protect an accused person's right to a fair trial, and in 
particular ensure that evidence favourable to the accused is disclosed in accordance with the 
law or the requirements of a fair trial.”3 
When prosecuting a crime (and sometimes during investigation), the prosecution may at times 
come by evidence which favours the defence’s case. However, this potentially exculpatory 
evidence is rarely provided to the defence. More so, the accused would rarely have the ability 
to find out if any such exculpatory evidence has been unearthed and collated by the prosecution. 
It is therefore arguable that without a specific legal duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, the 
prosecution is left with unfettered discretion as to what evidence to disclose to the accused. 
Abuse of such unfettered discretion can and usually leads to grave violations of the rights of 
the accused to a fair trial, access to justice, and the right to fair administrative action.  
In Brady v. Maryland the accused’s appeal arose from murder charges in the lower court where 
the accused John Brady and his accomplice Donald Boblit hatched a plan to steal a vehicle.4 
After identifying a victim and stealing his car his accomplice killed the victim. They were both 
arrested, thereafter charged with robbery and murder. They both recorded several statements 
                                                          
1Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
2Cornel University Law, at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exculpatory_evidence . 
3 IAP (1999) “Standards of Professional Responsibility and Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of 
Prosecutors,” adopted by the International Association of Prosecutors on the twenty third day of April 1999, at 
http://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/Resources-Documentation/IAP-Standards-(1)/English.pdf.aspx. 
4 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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at the police station. During their trial the prosecution failed to disclose evidence which 
exonerated Brady from the murder, as his accomplice had confessed in one of his statements 
to killing the victim. As a result they were both convicted of murder and sentenced to death. 
Brady appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s sentence and ordered a re-
trial on the issue of the murder sentence .The court held that the suppression or withholding by 
the state of material evidence exculpatory to an accused is a violation of due process. 
The prosecution usually has at its disposal the state resources including finances, support of 
the state machinery including security forces, and general state influence over matters. In this 
regard, there are certain established overarching principles aimed at guaranteeing, to the 
greatest extent possible, the protection of the rights of the accused and the equality of arms 
with the defence. These include the array of international human-rights conventions along with 
other international guidelines and principles outlining the conduct of prosecution. 
The rules of disclosure in the international criminal tribunals: the rules of procedure since 
Nuremberg have their roots in the United States (U.S.) Model.5 As far as disclosure is 
concerned, the rules deployed by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to guide extempore 
tribunals are strikingly similar to the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
16.6 
In their early stages of operations, the benches of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have made 
extensive references to the U.S.  Federal Criminal Procedure Rules. The U.S. discovery process 
comprises two major classifications: exculpatory and inculpatory materials. The prosecution’s 
case hinges on inculpatory evidence. Statute and Court Rules stipulate materials which may be 
disclosed or are exempted from disclosure. Application of these requirements vary from one 
state to another but are ubiquitous in obligating the prosecution to avail all evidence to the 
defence to aid in their preparation for trial. On the other hand, exculpatory evidence is 
                                                          
5Gideon Boas and William Schabas, International Criminal Law: Development in the Case Law of the ICTY, Vol 6 
Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2003, 227. 
6Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, NO IT-95-14-T, Decision on the production of  Discovery Material (27 January 1997) 
para 35-38. 
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underpinned by the constitutional law, as applied and interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Through Brady v. Maryland and its progeny cases, the Supreme Court has consistently 
delivered on this mandate.7 
Central to nearly all criminal rules and procedure across the globe, is the protection, promotion 
and advancement of the right of an accused to promptly obtain discovery of all materials in 
possession of the prosecution, and this includes any and all material necessary for preparation 
of defence as well as those outside the ambit of constitutional mandate.   
 
In England in the 1920s pre-trial discovery was seldom allowed. At common law, the courts 
did not have authority to direct pre-trial discovery in criminal matters.8 In the absence of a 
statute specifically directing such a mandate, a trial court could not arrogate itself the duty to 
compel a party to disclose evidence. Pre-trial disclosures were generally perceived to be 
subversive to justice. Discovery could only be aided by mutual exchange of information in the 
pre-trial process. This changed in the 1930s with the first statutory intervention. The legislative 
intervention institutionalized trial-court discretion in matters disclosure and directed that, 
where the statute is not specific as to whether an item is subject to disclosure, the intervention 
of the court as to such a determination would be final. This discretional leeway resulted in 
varied outcomes in as far the compelling discovery in concerned.  
In Kenya, the legal system has been transformed by the new Constitution the country’s supreme 
law effectively binding all persons and state organs; it forms the basis of all laws of the 
country.9 It promotes the spirit of democracy by protecting the human rights of all citizens. 
Change finally came to Kenya with the introduction of a Bill of Rights in chapter four of the 
said constitution which cemented citizens’ rights coupled with an introduction of social-
economic rights. Article 35 provides that every Kenyan has the right to access of information 
held by the government.10 A similar view is portrayed in Article 50(2)(j) which provides that 
                                                          
7373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
8People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court N.Y 24, 156 N.E 84(1927) at 28. 
9 The Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
10 The Constitution. 
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an alleged offender has the right to be promptly appraised of all the materials and information 
in possession of the prosecution.11 Article 25 further espouses that the right to fair trial cannot 
be limited; it is listed as one of the non-derogable rights.12  
The Criminal Procedure Code provides a step by step process from arrest of an accused to 
sentencing.13 It is thus a set of rules and procedural guidelines aimed at an orderly facilitation 
of the criminal judicial process in a manner congruent not just with the Constitution but with 
other established principles of fairness and justice too. Section 42 of the Act was amended by 
inserting Section 42A(1) which provides that pursuant to Article 50(2) (j) of the Constitution, 
the prosecution shall inform the accused person in advance of all the evidence the prosecution 
intends to rely on and ensure the accused person has reasonable access to that evidence.14  
The Evidence Act applies to all judicial proceedings before the court and regulates what facts 
are admissible and how the process of administration can be conducted.15It places the burden 
of proof on the person that alleges the facts. It deals with aspects of obtaining evidence before 
trial, adducing evidence at trial, applying and assessing evidence for proof or disproof of a fact. 
The Act provides that evidence to prove facts alleged must be adduced orally and must be 
direct.16 However, the Act is silent on the issue of exculpatory evidence. 
This study interrogates both case law and established legal framework to underscore the 
interchange between the right of the accused to fair trial including the right to full evidentiary 
disclosures and the need to ensure victims and witnesses of offences are protected.  
1.1 Statement of Problem 
It is arguable that although the right of the accused to the entirety of exculpatory evidence 
(including mitigating evidence, potentially exculpatory evidence) has to be weighed against 
the safety of witnesses, victims and their families; the duty of the United Nations (UN) in 
                                                          
11 The Constitution. 
12 The Constitution. 
13 Cap 75, Laws of Kenya. 
14 Section 16, The Security Laws (Amendment) Act No.19 of 2014. 
15 Cap 80, Laws of Kenya. 
16 Section 62. 
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upholding its mandate under the UN Charter  and the national security interests of the states so 
involved, not much has been done, both jurisprudentially and legislatively, more so in Kenya, 
to achieve sustainable ideals.17 
 
For starters, there is very little jurisprudential guidance on the delicate balance between the 
interests of all the other parties so involved in a trial and the rights of the accused. Courts have 
increasingly advanced the need for both the prosecution and the general public to disabuse 
themselves of the tendency to treat alleged offenders with disdain and loath even before 
material evidence is provided either in proof or disproof of their guilt. This conviction is 
premised primarily on presumption of innocence and while profoundly progressive and 
objective, remains significantly blind to the possibilities of surprise and unexpected 
interferences or threats from the accused directly or from his or her associates and 
sympathizers. There is therefore an inherent need for the judicial process to effectively appraise 
itself on the circumstances that circumscribe every case subjected to it with the view to 
establishing proper mechanisms and processes tailored to achieve an idyllic balance. 
It necessarily follows therefore, that the duty of a prosecutor, acting on behalf of the Republic 
is not to achieve a conviction no matter what, but rather to be a minister of justice that is to 
help the court arrive at a just and fair decision in the circumstances of each case. Prosecutors 
must therefore avail all information relevant to the case, regardless of whether any of the 
disclosures supports or weakens their case. However, the right to a fair-trial is not entirely a 
monopoly of an accused person but rather a delicate balance of competing interests and 
liberties. Further, it is arguable that the absence of a reciprocally strict timely disclosure on the 
part of the defence following a shift of evidential burden, renders any such expectation or 
argument for such expectation moot at best effectively giving the defence undue leverage and 
creating an uneven playing field.  
                                                          
17 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945 
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1.2 Statement of Objective 
Overarching this study is the need to not only determine whether non-disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence amounts to a violation of the right of the accused to fair trial but also to interrogate 
the interplay of the competing rights of the accused persons and victims with respect to such 
evidence. Specifically, the study aims at: 
a) Examining the effectiveness of existing legal and policy framework on safeguarding 
the right of an accused to fair trial as well as guaranteeing the safety of witnesses. 
b) Assessing the practice at the international criminal tribunals and the ICC to highlight 
the lessons Kenya could learn in as far as witness protection and the right of an accused 
to fair trial is concerned. 
c) Underscoring the measures that can be sustainably put in place to ensure the rights of 
an accused to fair trial is guaranteed without impugning the need to protect witnesses 
from potentially harmful evidentiary disclosures. 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study seeks to address the following pertinent concerns: 
a) Does the prosecutor have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in Kenya? 
b) What is the interplay of the rights of victims of offences to justice and the right of an 
accused to a fair trial? 
c) Does Kenya have domestic legal, policy and procedural framework as well as 
jurisprudence on exculpatory evidence?  
d) Are international rules and policy framework on exculpatory evidence sufficient 
enough for Kenya to adopt its best practices? 
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
This study is premised on Aristotle’s theory of justice and focuses on distributive justice. 
Aristotle derives two principles of justice. First, is corrective or commutative justice which is 
justice applied by courts to redress civil wrongs and restores a balance caused by criminal 
behaviour. Second, is distributive justice that states each person gets what is fair and what is 
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due to him. Together, the two principles espouse that society should be organized in a way that 
grants, protects and guarantees utmost liberties to its constituents, constrained only by the 
natural principle that guarantees of one constituent do not undermine those of another. 
Additionally, inequities can only be condoned in instances where the worst-off party is more 
advantaged than they would be under an equal distribution arrangement.18 
 
Underpinning this study is the hypothesis that failure to disclose exculpatory evidence amounts 
to a fundamental infringement of an accused’s entitlement to fair process. Furthermore the 
existing legal and regulatory framework as well as procedural guidelines on fair trial of 
criminal cases is inadequately equipped at effectively creating a parallelism between the 
competing rights of victims, witnesses and their families with that of the accused to exculpatory 
evidence. Accordingly, the study understands the premise upon which Aristotle’s theory of 
justice draws inspiration-that whereas individuals have certain rights and liberties, the exercise 
of the same must not be to the disenfranchisement of others. An accused right to fair trial 
including the right to access, question witnesses and their testimonies must be effectively 
weighed against all the circumstances surrounding the case. This is not to say however, that 
the right to fair trial can be constrained. As a matter of fact, it is one of the inalienable rights 
guaranteed and safeguarded under the Constitution. Limiting access to identity of witnesses or 
information likely to lead to positive identification of a witness when there are real threats of 
harm inconsequence warrants operationalization of witness protection measures. These 
measures must however, not be as extreme as to prejudice or limit an accused’s ability to mount 
effective defence. 
Aristotle’s theory of justice is thus foundational to this study which primarily revolves around 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence. However, evidentiary disclosure should be balanced so as 
not to infringe on the rights of victims and witnesses. To this end, justice can be summed up as 
adequate consideration of the rights, needs and exigencies of all parties to a trial process.  
                                                          
18Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Book V), 10ed, Keagan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company 
Limited, 1906, 136-149. 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This study lays significant emphasis on an analysis of the relevant available literature on this 
subject. The research conducted a qualitative systematic review of various sources. In this 
regard it relies on primary sources for example judicial reports, bar publications, scholarly 
opinions, statutes, dissertations, decided cases from Kenya and international practice on non-
disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 
Secondary sources included newspapers, books, academic articles, law journals, 
encyclopedias, treatises and internet sources.  
 
1.6 Literature Review 
In order to effectively test its hypothesis, answer its underpinning question and fulfil its 
overarching objective; this study relies heavily on the stellar scholarly, jurisprudential and 
statistical works of exemplary industry experts and professionals on the topic of criminology 
and criminal law. It not only looks to these extensive studies and authorities to underscore both 
local and international practice but also seeks to understand and highlight the intricate balance 
between the competing rights of the accused and the victims of his or her alleged aggression 
through the lenses of exculpatory evidence.  The study however notes the rarity of detailed 
related studies as is indicative of the state of affairs. As such, it relies on a wide array of studies 
and literature, both old and new to test its principal hypothesis on the topical question.  
The Right to Fair Trial 
In Kenya, the right to fair trial is as absolute as it is central to unprejudiced administration of 
justice. According to Scholastica Omondi, so crucial is this right that a trial body properly 
seized of such cases must be careful to not only act competently, independently and impartially 
but also guard against deliberate and calculated abuse by any persons or authority. She argues 
that the concept of fair trial and an accused’s entitlement to it as a procedural requirement is 
foundationally underpinned by the doctrine of presumption of innocence and has historically 
gained global acknowledgment and affirmation to the point that numerous concerned 
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international human rights monitoring organs have been established specifically to ensure 
criminal process is fair and the rights of an accused are not violated.19  
 
Omondi further asserts that the right to fair judicial process is statistically the most prevalently 
litigated human liberties globally with incredibly rich jurisprudence. She notes for instance, 
that in Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court determined that an accused’s right 
to a fair and expedited trial is a due process entitlement that must be respected at times during 
the trial process.20 According to her, the fundamental objective of the fair-trial liberties is to 
not only limit prosecutorial overreach but also ensure proper and unbiased dispensation of 
justice. It is notable however, that while Omondi acknowledges the fundamental functional 
role respect for an accused’s right to fair judicial process plays in the dispensation of justice, it 
is lost on her the need to balance the same with the safety of witnesses to achieve a similar end.  
 
Like Omondi, Joseph Kipkoech Biomdo analyses that as a norm of the international human 
rights practice and ordinance, the right to a fair judicial process is specifically intentioned at 
protecting people from arbitrary and unlawful deprivation or curtailment of other fundamental 
liberties and primarily encompasses various domestic and international shields aimed at 
protecting and promoting fair and public hearing before an impartial and dispassionate judicial 
trial process.21 Biomdo argues that as a fundamental pillar of any self-respecting democratic 
state, the right to fair trial including the right to full disclosure of both exculpatory and 
inculpatory evidence, is not merely a legal and ethical concept used to give meaning to or 
describe procedural rules of a criminal judicial process as well as treatment of the accused, but 
rather a basic concept of the rule of law aimed at facilitating fair judicial process. He notes that 
whereas the scope of fair trial varies from one criminal jurisdiction to another, there is a general 
consensus that associated guarantees must be observed, respected and protected from the 
                                                          
19 Omondi S, 'The Right to a Fair Trial and the Need to Protect Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Challenges of 
Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse under the Adversarial Legal System in Kenya’ 2 Quest Journals Journal of Research 
in Humanities and Social Science 3, 2014, 38-60. 
20 (1972) 407 U S, 514-515 
21 Biomdo J, 'Judicial Enforcement of the Right to a Fair Trial without Unreasonable Delay under Article 50 of the 
Constitution of Kenya' Unpublished LL.M Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2015, 35. 
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commencement of investigations against the accused to the trial and any appeals and reviews 
thereafter. In Kenya, the right of the accused to fair trial is enshrined in the Constitution and is 
an absolute, non-derogable right.22 
 
He makes reference to an attempt at interpretation by Justice Shahabuddin in Prosecution v 
Slobodan Milosevic where the court asserted that “the fairness of a trial need not require 
perfection in every detail.23 The essential question is whether the accused has had a fair chance 
of dealing with the allegations against him”. There is no single standard test or template for 
fairness upon which local courts can draw inference. 
 
Unlike Omondi however, Biomdo fails to acknowledge the possibility of overlap or 
competition between the liberties of an accused including access to evidence and witnesses and 
the possible adverse limiting consequences such unlimited or uncensored access may have on 
witnesses and victims and thus the trial itself. This oversight is possibly excusable to his focus 
primarily on the right to expeditious disposal of criminal cases. Nonetheless, there is an 
undeniably compelling consensus among Omondi, Biomdo and this study, that Kenya lacks an 
explicit mechanism or benchmark critical to effective uniform determination as to what 
amounts to a fair judicial process.  
 
Prosecution 
This research also reviewed a study by Rimpy Bhardwaj on the duty and obligations of a 
prosecutor as a custodian of the state criminal policy.24 Bhardwaj’s study not only examines 
the critical interrogation of the historical roles of a prosecutor but also looks into the legislative 
history of the powers and obligations of the prosecution. He argues that on a fundamentally 
                                                          
22Article 25, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
23 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic (Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal), IT-02-54-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 16 June 2004, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,47fdfb590.html [accessed 21 March 2019]. 
24 Bhardwaj R, 'A Critical Study of the Role of Prosecutor in Criminal Law' 3 International Journal of Law 4, 2017, 1-
7. 
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basic level, a public prosecutor’s primary duty is to prosecute cases at the behest of the state. 
As a protector of public policy therefore, a prosecutor’s primary focus is effective 
administration of criminal justice. He must therefore disabuse himself of the natural inclination 
to deviate from this focus to ferociously advance the interests of victims at the expense of 
fairness and justice. His study gives a rather important glimpse into the centrality of the doctrine 
of presumption of innocence and the principle of fair trial on impartial and effective 
dispensation of justice. Of importance to this study too is Bhardwaj’s conclusion that success 
of prosecution in the future will be determined and weighed primarily on the basis of its 
response to emerging prosecutorial realities. One such emerging issue is the safety of victims 
and witnesses of crime and the balance of the inherent needs of these parties with the trial 
liberties of an accused more so access to witnesses and evidence. Many countries are 
increasingly acknowledging the threat of failure to protect witnesses and victims on the course 
of justice. For instance, Kenya just recently made amendments to the Witness Protection Act25.  
The law not only makes important distinctive definitions but also outlines circumstances under 
which individuals can be enlisted for state protection. 
According to Lisa Kurcias, the duty of a prosecutor and particularly the duty to make full 
disclosures to an accused with respect to particulars of crime including both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence as well as list of witnesses is one that has its root both in law and 
professional ethics.26 Her argument is primarily anchored in Brady v. Maryland a U.S. Supreme 
Court trial that held that a prosecutor perpetrates a due process infringement, justifying 
annulment of a conviction, if it is proven in evidence, that they suppressed evidence.27 Kurcias 
admits that the U.S. Model Rules and Codes do not offer sufficient definitions and explanations 
of important foundation principles.  
 
Kurcias argues, for instance, that the term “justice” is very ambiguous, both legal and ethics 
rules provide very little guidance to prosecutors on its meaning yet the same is central to 
effective dispensation of justice. Kurcias relied on Berger v. United States where the Supreme 
                                                          
25Cap 79, Laws of Kenya. 
26 Kurcias L, 'Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence’, 69 Fordham Law Review 3, 2000, 1206-1229. 
27 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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Court held that, in his role, the prosecutor is not merely a representative of a typical party to a 
dispute, but rather a hegemony whose primary duty to superintend fairly is as efficacious as its 
responsibility to hegemonize all; and whose involvement, thus in criminal trial is not to win a 
case and achieve a conviction no matter what, but rather to ensure justice is not only done but 
also seen to be done.28 This study agrees with Kurcias that while a prosecutor, in pursuit of 
justice, is allowed to exhibit fair aggression and earnestness, such vigour should be properly 
directed and must focus primarily on effective trial aimed not at conviction of the accused at 
all costs but rather on provision of evidence to court to provide a full picture on occurrence of 
events leading to the crime under trial.  
This study notes however, that attaining that Zen-like balance is incredibly burdensome and 
calls for effective safeguards and guidance. These can only be operationalized by legislation 
and trial courts themselves.  
Witness Protection 
According to Wilson Kiprono, Kibet Ngetich and Wokabi Mwangi not all crimes are equal.29 
Some criminal activities exhibit immeasurably profound impact both on human development 
and security effectively necessitating equally effective profound control and prosecutorial 
measures. Crimes such as human and drug trafficking, organized crime, murder, rape, 
terrorism, human rights abuses and systemic corruption all have far reaching consequences 
that, if unaddressed, pose serious existential threats to the society. By their very nature these 
crimes invoke a lot of emotions and oftentimes involve many parties linked to the accused 
effectively posing dangers to both victims and witnesses. A study conducted by the trio 
established that one of the key limitations encountered by prosecution in dealing with such 
crimes is the reluctance of victims and witnesses to volunteer critical information for fear of 
revenge and recrimination either from the accused themselves or their affiliates.  Even where 
witnesses cooperate, there is always difficulty in guaranteeing their safety. In the study, they 
                                                          
28 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
 
29 Kiprono W, Ngetich K and Mwangi W, 'Challenges Facing Criminal Justice System in Relation to Witness 
Protection in Kenya' 20 IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 2015, 93-97. 
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not only examine legal and socio-cultural challenges to witness protection in Kenya but also 
interrogate the existing legal and institutional measures of witness support, assistance and 
security.  
This study concurs with the trio that whereas tremendous developments have been made 
towards appreciation of witness protection as a fundamental component of fair and just trial, a 
lot still remains to be done to foster legislation, training and research to direct and facilitate 
witnesses’ protection. A witness protection scheme that is fool-proof, immune to external 
infiltration and influence could potentially inspire tremendous confidence leading to successful 
prosecution of cases previously unimaginable including trial of high-profile persons.  
Allan George Ward takes a completely different look into the fair trial and witness protection 
debate.30 He argues that whereas adoption of witness protection measures is paramount to 
effective administration of justice, care must be taken though to ensure certain measures such 
as total concealment of identity of witnesses, do not unfairly handicap the accused persons, 
who themselves, it must not be forgotten, are innocent too, until proven guilty beyond a shadow 
of doubt. An activist approach to witness protection runs a complete and potentially crippling 
risk of creating an unintended notion that the accused is guilty ab initio. To test his hypothesis, 
Ward looks at the witness protection schemes, mechanisms and measures adopted and 
operationalized in the U.S, European Union, the U.K, and South Africa. The Supreme Court in 
Alford v. United States held that “The witnesses name and address open countless avenues of 
in-court examination and out-of-court investigation.31 To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry 
at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross examination itself.” Ward notes 
further that the principle upon which this determination of the court is anchored is timeless. An 
accused must have the right to defend h  imself by testing the evidence against him. He adds 
that the same principle is enshrined in Article 6 (3) (d).32 
 
                                                          
30 Ward A, 'The Evidence of Anonymous Witness in Criminal Courts: Now and Into the Future’ 21 The Denning Law 
Journal 1, 2009, 67-97. 
31 282 US 687 (1931).   
32The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. 
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Ward states that, like the United States, South Africa is very indifferent to concealment of 
witness identity on account that it places unlawful limits on an otherwise inalienable right of 
the accused to challenge the evidence against them. This debate was effectively put to rest in S 
v. Leepile.33 So strong and compelling is the need to safeguard the right to fair trial even in 
light of emerging realities that even the European Union admits that whereas protection of 
witnesses is paramount to effective administration of justice, care should be taken to ensure 
established witness protection measures are not misdirected and misapplied to the disadvantage 
of the alleged offender. The Court of Appeal in R v. Meyers, while commenting on the degree 
of diligence that must be exercised by the prosecution to be allowed to provide anonymous 
testimony stated that the duty of the prosecution in the context of a witness anonymity 
application must go beyond the ordinary disclosure obligations. Accordingly, extensive 
interrogation of the background of any and all potential anonymous witnesses must always be 
required.34  
 
Ward’s study offers incredible insights into the delicate issue that is a trial faced with the 
challenge of safeguarding an accused’s entitlement to fair process while at the same time 
confronted by potential threats on the safety of key witnesses. Even local jurisprudence 
acknowledges these intricacies. In fact, the trial bench in Thomas Patrick Gilbert 
Cholmondeley  v. Republic observed that whereas the prosecution is at all costs under a strict 
obligation to make full evidentiary disclosures to an accused as a matter of right, care must 
however to be taken to safeguard the safety of witnesses and victims.35 It is noteworthy that 
the domestic jurisprudence on matters witness safety is not as developed as other jurisdictions 
like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union; several steps have been 
taken to not only recognize its relevance but also explore various sustainable options as 
captured in numerous debates. Still, there is no comprehensive guideline on the application of 
                                                          
33 (5)1986(4) SA187 (W). 
34 [2008] EWCA Crim 2989 
35 2008[eKLR]. 
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the same with various principles and postulations scattered across statutes including the 
Witness protection Act36, Criminal Procedure Code37 and the Constitution.38 
 
International Criminal tribunals 
After the Second World War the world vowed that the atrocities of such magnitude would 
never happen again. International criminal law has progressed in the last 50 years especially 
with regard to the setting up of international criminal court and tribunals. The Nuremberg Trial 
and judgment left a legacy particularly the formulation of the Nuremberg principles, which 
influenced the development of international criminal law and practice that resulted in the 
creation of a permanent international criminal court.  
 
Dr. Misa Zgonec-Rowzey examines the international criminal tribunals stating that; two ad hoc 
tribunals established by the UN Security Council to provide a quick and effective response to 
conflicts of an international and domestic nature, respectively, proved to be relatively 
successful experiments, producing valuable jurisprudence of substance and procedure.39 The 
ICTY’s Statute was used as a model for the ICTR’s Statute which in turn provided the basis 
for the Statute of the SCSL. The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and later of the ICC, together 
with general principles of international criminal law, were copied by other mixed and 
internationalised courts and tribunals. The establishment of mixed tribunals in post-conflict 
situations is an effective means to bring to trial those responsible for serious crimes, especially 
where there is a non-functional, corrupt or biased judiciary and lack of political will or funding 
to establish an international tribunal.40  
 
The analysis of the international criminal tribunals in this manual leaves out the important 
aspect of discovery, specifically exculpatory evidence. This study therefore seeks to fill that 
                                                          
36Cap 79, Laws of Kenya. 
37Cap 75, Laws of Kenya. 
38The Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
39 Rowzey M ‘International Criminal Law Manual’ International Bar of Association Report, 2010, 47-78. 
40 Rowzey M. 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
gap by extensively addressing the issue of exculpatory evidence in these tribunals and the vast 
case transcripts which has enriched jurisprudence in international criminal law. 
 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
The study is premised on archival research; as such it faced various limitations including: 
a) There is limited jurisprudential guidance on the delicate balance between the interests 
of all parties involved in a trial and the accused’s rights.  
b) A lot of inconsistencies especially in African jurisprudence in as far as interpretation 
and application of the right of accused to fair trial and protection of witnesses are 
concerned. 
c) Most of the resources the study relied on were catalogued, exhaustively covered 
repositories and publications making the sourcing process time-consuming. 
d) Difficulties in gaining full access to important information from key primary sources 
such as government records. 
1.8 Hypotheses 
a) The existing legal and regulatory framework as well as procedural guidelines on fair 
trial of criminal cases is inadequately equipped at effectively creating a balance 
between the competing rights of victims, witnesses and their families with that of the 
accused.   
b) Non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence amounts to a fundamental breach of the right 
to a fair trial of the accused. 
1.9 Chapter Breakdown 
This study is broken down into the following four chapters:- 
Chapter one outlines the background to the study, statement of the problem, statement of 
objective, questions that guided the entire research, theoretical framework relied upon, the 
research methodology, literature review, the study limitation, hypotheses and the conclusions 
that were arrived at. 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter two not only discusses whether a prosecutor is duty-bound to disclose exculpatory 
evidence in Kenya but also discusses the interplay of the accused’s right to fair process with 
the right of victims and the state to justice. Further, the chapter examines domestic legal, policy 
and procedural framework as well as jurisprudence on exculpatory evidence. It overlays key 
foundational components of international practice as identified in chapter three and the best 
practices Kenya can emulate. 
Chapter three deals with international rules and policy framework on exculpatory evidence and 
with close reference to the rules of procedure and case law emanating from the international 
criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Chapter four not only provides a summary overview of the entire study but also outlines the 
conclusions of the study and makes recommendations.   
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CHAPTER 2 
DUTY TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE   
2.0 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, a crime is an offence not just against the victims but also against 
the state generally. As such, it behoves both the investigation and prosecution as a matter of 
public interest and policy, to impartially and without a scintilla of malice (no matter how 
tempting) ensure justice is not only done but also seen to have been done. A prosecutor’s duty 
is thus not to secure a guilty verdict at all costs but rather to see to it that facts material to a 
crime, inclusive of those favourable to the alleged offender, are adduced in court and in a 
manner that is not only dispassionate, ethical and fair, but also clear and firm. Any perceived 
departure from this benevolent obligation brings to question whether the prosecution is guided 
by secondary aspirations other than authentic vindication of the trial process. One such 
prevalent departure is suppression or failure, deliberate or otherwise, of the prosecution to 
supply evidence material either to the guilt or punishment of an offender.  
 
This Chapter tests this study’s hypothesis that non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence amounts 
to a fundamental breach of the right to a fair trial of the accused. It not only analyses  the role 
of the prosecution in Kenya particularly with respect to the obligation to reveal exculpatory 
evidence but also discusses the interplay between the entitlement of an accused to fair process 
and safety of witnesses on account of such disclosures. Part 2.1 examines the domestic and 
international legal frameworks on the right to fair trial. Part 2.2 discusses the power dynamics 
between the state as represented by the prosecution and the accused with the view to 
understanding the implications of the same on evidentiary disclosure obligations. Part 2.3 on 
the other hand introduces the concept of witness safety and confidentiality and interrogates the 
nuance of the same with prosecution’s evidentiary disclosure obligations and the eventual 
impact of such nuance on the right of an accused to fair trial.  
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Legal Framework 
2.1.1 International Instruments 
Article 2(5) provides that “…general rules of international law shall form part of the law of 
Kenya.”41 Article 2 (6) further provides that “…any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya 
shall form part of the law of Kenya.”42 Effectively, international conventions, treaties and 
agreements on human rights and fundamental freedom and specifically those touching on the 
right to fair trial and protection of witness confidentiality and safety ratified by Kenya are 
enforceable per the laid down legislation. However, in the post-2010 Constitution a lot has 
changed regarding Kenya being a dualist state. In the previous dispensation, international law 
did not have significant influence. Consequently, it would only be relied upon where there were 
no statutory interventions on a matter, or for purposes of eliminating ambiguities from domestic 
legislation.43 However, determining the correct position of international law in Kenya has not 
been easy; courts have reached different positions regarding the same. Harmonization of 
municipal and international laws would be the best way forward; furthermore, Kenya could 
seek guidance from the International Law Commission.44 The international instruments are: 
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) also known as the Banjul 
Charter, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (also known as ‘The Torture Convention’), the International Covenant for Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).  
 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948 
Simply known as the Universal Declaration, the UDHR is an international document that not 
only outlines but also defines the basic rights and fundamental freedoms to which every 
individual is entitled. From the transgressions perpetrated by states against particular leanings 
                                                          
41 The Constitution. 
42 The Constitution. 
43Ambani J, ‘Navigating Past the “Dualist Doctrine”: The Case for  Progressive Jurisprudence on the Application of 
International Human Rights Norms in Kenya’ in M Killander (ed), International Law and Domestic Human Rights 
Litigation in Africa , Pretoria University Law Press, 2010, 25-30. 
44Kabau T and Ambani J, ‘The 2010 Constitution and the Application of International Law in Kenya: A Case of 
Migration to Monism or Regression to Dualism?’ 1 Africa Nazarene University Law Journal 1, 2013, 36-55. 
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and tribes of their society, it was undeniably clear that even governments could not be trusted 
to protect their own. There emerged a need to shield citizens from the atrocious acts of their 
governments. Domestic interventions were no longer sufficient at safeguarding the rule of law 
and protecting the innocent. The consistent and persistent application and invocation of the 
UDHR for nearly two thirds of a century has arguably made it binding as an integral component 
of customary international law.45 
 
Articles 8, 9, 10 and 1146 are very specific to the rights of the accused. Article 10 guarantees 
an accused’s right to fair trial and specifically states “…that everyone is entitled in full equality 
to a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of their 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against them”. Article 11 doubtlessly forms 
the foundation of this study. It provides a succinct summary into the rights and liberties of an 
accused.47 It states in Clause 1 that individuals accused of crimes have a right to be adjudged 
innocent until proven culpable by a court of competent jurisdiction and vide a process that 
safeguards their defence. Clause 2 adds that criminal law cannot apply retroactively and an 
accused has to be treated with dignity, respect and fairness as if they had not committed the 
crime for which they are charged.48 
 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICPPR) 1966 
Following the operationalization of the UDHR, it became apparent that effective wholistic 
impact on the lives and livelihoods of individuals across the globe demanded more than 
political pronouncement of what needed to be achieved. Accordingly, it became necessary to 
convert the basic tenets of the declaration into tangible instruments with legal force. The 
General Assembly asserted that it was important to complement this framework with an 
                                                          
45Bilder R and others, 'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary’, 88 The American Journal of 
International Law 3, 1994, 557-559. 
46Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1945. 
47Weissbrodt D and Hallendorff M, 'Travaux Preparatoires of the Fair Trial Provisions -- Articles 8 To 11 -- Of The 
Universal Declaration Of Human Rights', 21 Human Rights Quarterly, 1999, 1061-1096. 
48Hughes G, 'The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, 39 Journal of Religious Ethics 
1, 2011, 1-24. 
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instrument that captured the interdependence and interconnectedness of cultural, social and 
economic liberties.49 In 1966, ICPPR and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) instruments were adopted by the Assembly by way of consensus.50  
 
The right to fair trial, including the right of an accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, 
challenge prosecution evidence as well as access to potentially exculpatory evidence is 
provided for in Articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR.51 The ICCPR has had tremendous global 
policy influence. It continues to inform the drafting of human liberties in regional and domestic 
legal instruments and constitutions.  
 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 
Known simply as the Torture Convention and adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations.52 The Torture Convention was basically meant to buttress the universal right to fair 
trial and particularly the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise by 
an independent and competent judicial process.53 The fact that Kenya not only ratified the 
ICCPR but also affirmed and validated the Torture Convention when the ICCPR was in and of 
itself a sufficient guarantee of trial rights, is a demonstration of the country’s willingness to 
pursue justice and in particular, respect, promotion and preservation of the right to fair trial.  
 
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 
Unlike the ICCPR and the UDHR that are universal in nature and application, the African 
Charter on Human Rights (ACHPR) also known as the Banjul Charter, is a regional instrument 
whose application and reach is limited to the African nations that have ratified it. The ACHPR 
                                                          
49Kearney M, 'The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', 23 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 4, 2005, 551-570. 
50UN A/Res/ 2200 (XXI) 16 December 1966. 
51 Jixi Zhang, 'Fair Trial Rights in ICCPR', 2 Journal of Politics and Law 4, 2009, 39-43. 
52 UN A/Res/ 39/46 (10 December, 1984). 
53Silwal R, 'Right against Torture and Case of Maina Sunuwar: An Analysis In The Light of the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Or Punishment (CAT)’ SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011. 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
borrows heavily from the UDHR and the ICCPR with respect to the right to fair criminal 
process. It has helped guide Africa from the era of flagrant human rights violations to 
compliance.54 The instrument improved accountability across the continent. It establishes the 
groundwork and standards for the protection and promotion of human liberties in the continent. 
Since its operationalization nearly three decades ago, the ACPHR has consistently acted as a 
platform from which people could make human rights violation claims at the international stage 
effectively watering down sovereignty defence which countries generally involved in human 
rights violations invoke.55 
 
The ACHPR Charter acknowledges that the right to a fair trial is essential for the protection of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms and whose violation entitles the affected persons to 
an effective remedy. This right is provided for under the ACPHR Charter.56 It is noteworthy 
that despite the best of intentions of the discussed regional and international instruments in as 
far as protection, advancement and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
including the right to fair trial are concerned; effective implementation is fundamentally 
dependent on the good will of the individual member states.  
 
Kenya has for instance, endeavoured to domesticate these instruments through domestic legal 
mechanisms. Our Constitution recognizes international law as a source of the laws of Kenya.57 
With no specified hierarchy of norms courts are left to make differing decisions. However, 
these instruments ratified by Kenya should be enforced and there should be no reluctance of 
will on the part of the leadership to establish domestication mechanisms and framework. 
 
                                                          
54Barnidge R, 'Anti-Zionism, Jus Cogens, and International Law: The Case of the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter', 9 
The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 1, 2018, 77-92. 
55Barnidge R. 
56Article 7, ACHPR. 
57 Article 2(6), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
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2.1.2 Domestic Instruments 
It is noteworthy that operationalization of global and regional principles of human rights, and 
especially in their wide-sweeping form would be arduous if not outright impossible without 
home-grown domestic frameworks. In the absence of local instruments, the otherwise 
progressive provisions would remain merely advisory at best. Kenya, aware of this disconnect, 
has been on the forefront at establishing domestic legal frameworks for the implementation of 
these otherwise progressive global and regional instruments. Some of the domestic instruments 
that anchor the right to fair trial in Kenya include the Constitution,58 the Criminal Procedure 
Code,59 the Witness Protection Act60 and the Sexual Offences Act.61 This section interrogates 
each with the view to understanding the implications of each on protection, promotion and 
fulfilment of the right to fair trial. 
 
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
It obligates the state to not only observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the citizenry but also directs it to proactively enact and implement 
legislation to fulfil the country’s international obligations in respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. This also includes adoption and operationalization of numerous 
legislative, policy and regulatory measures, among others, including setting of standards, to 
facilitate progressive realization of the said rights and fundamental liberties. One such right is 
the right to fair trial.  
 
The Constitution restates and affirms the salient provisions of the UDHR, the ICCPR and the 
ACHPR on the right to fair trial.62 It provides that every individual has the right to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before 
                                                          
58The Constitution. 
59 Cap 75, Laws of  Kenya. 
60 Act No.16 of 2006. 
61 Act No.3 of 2006. 
 
62Article 50, Constitution of Kenya. 
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a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body and that all 
accused persons have a right to fair trial including the rights: to be presumed innocent; to be 
sufficiently appraised of the charges against them in sufficient detail, in a manner and language 
they understand; to be afforded adequate time and facilities to properly and adequately prepare 
for their case including possible access to legal representation; to be tried expeditiously; to be 
present during their trial unless otherwise reasonably held; to refuse to adduce self-
incriminating evidence; to remain silent during the trial; to adduce and challenge evidence as 
well as to be notified beforehand of the evidence the prosecution intends to place reliance on, 
and the same to be made accessible. 
 
Like freedom from torture and degrading, inhuman and cruel punishment or treatment, freedom 
from slavery or servitude and the right to habeas corpus, the right to fair trial is absolute and 
cannot be in any way, form or manner, limited or restrained. Accordingly, an accused cannot 
be denied an opportunity to not only access but also challenge evidence adduced by witnesses 
against them. In instances where such confrontation is likely to jeopardize witness safety, it is 
incredibly paramount for courts to determine what amounts to justice or fair trial. Exposing 
witnesses to possible intimidation and imminent danger merely on account of openness does 
not in any way serve justice if doing so prevents them from disclosing the truth or giving 
accurate unadulterated testimonies. Secondly, if concealment of witness identity for fear of 
reprisal or any other negative consequences has little to no impact on the core or materiality of 
the case then it can be presumed that such a move is in the interest of justice and does not in 
any way violate, restrict or limit the right of an accused to fair trial. These determinations and 
interpretations are however not explicit in the Constitution but rather left to the discretion of 
courts effectively exposing the weakest link in the chain of the trial process. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 73) 
Unlike the other legal, regulatory and policy frameworks on the right to fair trial, the Criminal 
Procedure Code (CPC) does not reinstate these liberties but provides a chronological order 
from arrest to passing of sentence. It is the link between the ideals prescribed in the supreme 
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law and the net outcome that is the Penal Code. Its primary purpose is to steer the judicial 
process clear of interferences and make it as dependable, reliable, consistent and replicable as 
possible. In other words, it serves to reduce to the utmost minimum, discretion and judgment 
in criminal judicial process. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act amended the CPC by 
inserting Section 42A which provides inter alia that  
the prosecution may, with leave of court, not disclose certain evidence which it intends to 
rely on until immediately before the hearing, if the evidence may facilitate the commission of 
other offences or if it is not in the public interest to disclose such evidence.63 
 
Like their counterparts at the international criminal tribunals, local judicial officers struggle to 
enforce accountability on the part of the state in as far as the right of an accused to fair trial is 
concerned. Several studies that have ventured into this phenomenon have identified 
weaknesses both in law and procedure that have pushed judicial officers to provide guidance. 
Kipkoech Biomdo for instance, interrogated the judicial interpretation of the right to fair trial 
without unreasonable delay.64His contestation rested on the existing variegated understanding 
of what constitutes unreasonable delay. He intertwined the interpretation with other similarly 
unclear elements of fair trial including the right of an accused to interrogate evidence and 
witnesses against them. Like many scholars before him, Biomdo examines that, in the absence 
of clarity in law as to how the accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and challenge 
evidence not in his favour can be weighed against witness safety, violation of the liberties of 
the accused will persist. Judges have been categorical on the need to adequately safeguard these 
rights. In Ann Njogu and 5 others v. Republic, the late Justice Onesmus Mutungi, held that any 
violation of the right of an accused to fair trial in whatever manner is illegal and an affront to 
the rules of procedure.65 It matters not the form the violation takes, whether a delay of a 
procedural requirement or withholding of evidence. In Gerald Macharia Githuku v. Republic, 
the Court of Appeal asserted that it does not matter that failure to fully disclose evidence does 
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not cause the accused any prejudice, the failure by the prosecution to abide by the rules of 
procedure cannot be downplayed.66  
  
The Witness Protection Act No.16 of  2006 
As already discussed, the right to fair trial is absolute and not subject to limitation, judicial or 
otherwise. An accused therefore has the right to institute court proceedings claiming that his 
right to a fair trial has been denied, violated or infringed, or threatened. There are however 
exceptional circumstances that that while not in any way directly a threat to this right or limiting 
or violating it at all, require due consideration in the interest of justice and fairness. Such 
circumstances are oftentimes characterized by competing or overlapping liberties effectively 
requiring a court’s discretionary intervention. One such circumstance is protection of witnesses 
from apprehensible harm or threat of harm as a consequence of their testimony. It is against 
this background that the Witness protection Act (WPA) finds its footing. The WPA is 
doubtlessly foundational to the facilitation of witness safety in Kenya and by extension, fair 
criminal judicial process. The WPA not only makes important distinctive definitions but also 
outlines circumstances under which individuals can be enlisted for state protection.67 It 
empowers the court, on application by the prosecution, to issue orders effectively limiting full 
disclosure to the defence in instances where apprehension of threat or risk is real.68 Without an 
elaborate and effective witness protection mechanism, some investigations are impossible to 
carry out, frustrating the administration of justice. 
 
It is notable however, that like other laws, legal and policy frameworks already discussed, the 
WPA, however progressive, is not without institutional and operational limitations. One 
fundamental challenge and concern commonly expressed in doubt of its efficiency is the 
inclusion of security agencies in its advisory board effectively hampering independence in 
cases involving state officials. Secondly there is insufficient counselling of victims of crimes 
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who are extremely traumatized psychologically and mentally. Thirdly emerging issues facing 
the witness protection programs have not been adequately addressed for example cyber stalking 
which affects witness safety management.  
 
 
The Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006 
This Act provides for wider definition of sexual offences, the protective measures taken in 
cases of sexual assault and other connected purposes. The right to fair trial is visible by how 
courts can declare a witness as vulnerable and protect them by the witness testifying under the 
cover of a witness protection box. This conceals the witness from the glare of the perpetrator 
and prevents further trauma. Secondly the court can direct that evidence be given through an 
intermediary. Thirdly the court in most instances allows testimony in camera. 
2.2 Prosecution’s Disclosure Obligations  
It is noteworthy that whereas all lawyers and advocates are superintended by strict legal and 
ethical rules of conduct, prosecutors are subject to even more stringent obligations. Unlike a 
private practitioner whose primary obligation is to be a zealous advocate and defender of the 
interest of his client, prosecutors are strictly obligated to impartially and passionately pursue 
justice in addition to their role as advocates.69 After all, they are defenders, not of a single 
individual, but of the state and the society generally. With this responsibility comes immense 
powers that far outstrip those enjoyed by other advocates and their clients.  
2.2.1 Inequity between the Prosecution and the Accused 
In addition to unlimited access to state machinery including police investigators, a prosecutor 
has unrestrained discretion to decide whom to prosecute and on what charges.70 This imbalance 
of power and privilege undeniably leads to a dangerous inequity between the defence and 
prosecution. Fundamentally therefore, the heightened obligation of the prosecution beyond 
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mere advocacy is to not only reduce this disparity of resources but to also ensure fair judicial 
process as well as stem any potential abuse of power. A prosecutor’s obligation is thus to pursue 
justice and no less. In furtherance of this obligation, and in an obvious attempt to effectively 
alleviate the inherent variance between the prosecution and the defence, the prosecution is 
expected to provide defendants with certain assistance. 
 
Ethically, the limitations and obligations placed on the prosecution are meant to not only limit 
potential prosecutorial overreach but to also safeguard the uprightness of the judicial process.71 
The prosecution is strictly required to ensure that all evidence, including those favourable to 
the accused, are fairly, ethically and dispassionately presented before a court of law. 
Accordingly, a prosecutor is strictly directed to refrain from acts or omission likely to result in 
conviction of innocent individuals. This obligation must however not blind a prosecutor to their 
first and foremost obligation- that of advocacy on behalf the state. Just as distasteful, is the 
erroneous acquittal of individuals guilty of crime.72 Nonetheless, the detachment required of 
the prosecutor to display does not preclude him from passionately and vigorously pursuing a 
case. In fact, every prosecutor is required to work their case to the best of their abilities.  
 
The obligation of the prosecution to effectively immerse itself to the pursuit of justice rather 
than conviction was reiterated and explained in Thomas Mboya Oluoch & Another v. Lucy 
Muthoni Stephen & Another.73 The court held that both the police and the prosecution must 
exercise their discretion to charge a person on the evidence of sound legal principles. High 
Court Justice Ojwang’ (as he then was) reasoned that prosecutors and police who are led by 
malice, chicanery, or who fail to act in good faith, in pursuing conviction of an accused cannot 
be allowed to hide under prosecutorial immunities should the victims of their conceited conduct 
rightfully pursue reparation. On this basis alone, it is foolhardy to expect that any reasonable 
prosecutor would prefer charges against an individual, on the premise of material and 
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information so contentious and so manifestly directed to be malicious. To take advantage of 
the state’s prosecutorial machinery, and to leverage the judicial process with this type of trial, 
is to appropriate the public legal services for self-serving endeavours and is tantamount to 
misapplication of power. 
2.2.2 Consequences of Violation of Prosecutorial Obligations 
It necessarily follows those prosecutors unfaithful to their obligation to not only disclose 
material evidence to the defence but also discharge their duties faithfully and dispassionately 
in the interest of justice, open themselves and the state to numerous legal liabilities. In Wycliffe 
Shakwila Mungo v. Republic, the High Court held that a prosecutor perpetrates a grave due 
process violation, necessitating countermanding of a conviction, if it is demonstrated that the 
prosecutor suppressed evidence.74 Justice Odunga addressed the need for the police and 
prosecution to endeavour to always operate above board to protect the integrity of the 
prosecutorial process. He observed that the police and the prosecution must exercise integrity 
and professionalism in undertaking investigations and should not be directed by spite other 
considerations collateral to fair process.  
 
It is however notable, that malice can be either express or implied from the conduct of the 
prosecution. A prosecution can either be lodged by a complaint or protestation of unlawful 
conduct to the police or on the premise of an illegality perpetrated in the presence of the police. 
Nonetheless, a mere lodging of a protestation does not warrant initiation of a prosecution. It is 
incumbent on the police to sufficiently investigate the accusation before instituting any charges 
against the alleged offender. Thus, the prosecution and the police are not merely conduits for 
complainants. They must exercise their obligations autonomously and impartially without 
duress, direction or control of any party.   
 
In instances where exonerating material or information is given to the police in the course of 
investigation, and they intentionally or unknowingly exclude them, it would be rational for one 
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to surmise that they are guided by considerations malicious and collateral to a fair judicial 
process. Failure to effectively investigate a claim or include all evidence material to an offence 
prior to mounting a prosecution may therefore be deemed as abuse of power and process.75 
 
The Kenyan criminal justice system hedges possible abuse of power by the police and the 
prosecution by placing the accused in a somewhat advantageous position. The country’s 
criminal administrative system places the accused’s guarantee of fair trial on a pedestal and 
demands the accused be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a shadow of doubt.76 
As such the accused is entitled to fairness and impartial investigation with the court specifically 
charged with the onerous responsibility to ensure these constitutional safeguards and 
guarantees are jealously protected and upheld at all times. The trial process should be speedy, 
judicious, transparent, fair and most importantly, be in full compliance with both the law and 
due process. The right to fair trial is one of the most important hallmarks of a fair society. In 
Rattiram v. State of M.P, the Supreme Court of India held that “…fundamentally, a fair and 
impartial trial has a sacrosanct purpose. It has a demonstrable object that the accused should 
not be prejudiced. A fair trial is required to be conducted in such a manner which would totally 
ostracize injustice, prejudice, dishonesty and favouritism.’’77 
This is in consonance with R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy’s famous holding that 
“…justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be 
done”.78 
 
It is arguable based on the foregoing, that deliberate and wilful suppression of evidence or 
withholding of facts and information material to a case by the prosecution amounts to 
subterfuge effectively opening the judicial process to ridicule and interferes with fair and 
impartial administration of justice. Indeed, Justice Odunga admitted in Wycliffe Shakwila 
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Mungo v. Republic  that impartial, disingenuous and malicious investigation aimed purely at 
building a case against the accused rather than portraying to the court the true occurrence of 
events based on facts and evidence and leaving to it to decide, is not only manipulative and 
reprehensible but also diverts the cause of justice from the established fundamental ideals.79He 
explained that where a report of a crime is made to the police, thorough investigations ought to 
be undertaken not just with a view to eliciting evidence favourable to the complainant but also 
evidence, if any, favourable to the suspect. In other words, investigations ought to be 
independently and impartially conducted and any evidence unearthed, whether favourable to 
the prosecution or not must be disclosed. 
2.2.3. Legal and ethical dimensions of disclosure obligations 
In view of the foregoing, it undeniably accurate to surmise that a prosecutor’s disclosure 
obligation has both ethical and legal dimensions. The ethical dimension is functionally 
informed by the desire to not only ensure fair play but also protect the integrity of the judicial 
process. This effectively creates a higher standard of behaviour for the prosecution. 
Suppression of evidence or unjustifiable making secret of witnesses material to a case and 
capable of establishing the innocence of an accused is borderline unethical and thus highly 
reprehensible.80 Such conduct negates the intentionality of fair process and goes parallel to a 
prosecutor’s general directive to pursue justice within specific operating guardrails. One such 
guardrail is the rule prohibiting withholding, deliberate or otherwise, of witnesses or facts 
favourable to the defence. 
 
On the other hand, the legal dimension of a prosecutor’s disclosure obligation is buttressed by 
both the need to alleviate the inherent inequity or imbalance of power between the parties as 
well as the desire to protect and safeguard an accused’s constitutional right to fair trial. These 
legal directives and restrictions stem from several authorities including: The Constitution,81 the 
Criminal Procedure Code82 and judicial case law. For instance, both the Criminal Procedure 
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Code and the Constitution obligate the state (prosecution), upon request, to make available to 
the accused, documents or any other evidentiary facts and information, material to the case, 
likelihood of disfavour to the prosecution’s case notwithstanding. Similarly, judicial opinions 
formulate restrictions and obligations for prosecutors in their holdings. In R v. Raphael Muoki 
Kalungu for instance, the High Court asserted that a prosecutor’s primary role is to pursue 
justice.83 Lady Justice Mutuku held that trial by ambush is not just unfair but also legally 
unprocedural. The prosecution and the court, have a legal obligation to aid the accused persons 
by providing them with adequate facilities and time to prepare their defence. She defined 
facilities to include full disclosure of all facts and information material to a case regardless of 
the potential disadvantage the same may occasion the prosecution.  
 
Lady Justice Mutuku’s decision was largely informed by R v. Stinchcombe, on the question of 
discovery and disclosure of material.84 The Canadian Supreme Court held that the prosecution 
has a constitutional duty to ensure the accused is provided access to the evidence they intend 
to adduce in proof of the charges against him. This duty extends to disclosure of material and 
information the prosecution is in possession of but may not necessarily adduce in court in proof 
of the said charges. This duty is especially compelling if the material and information the 
prosecution do not intend to rely on are favourable to the accused. And it matters not that the 
prosecution came across the evidence during investigations, at pre-trial or during the trial, they 
are still duty-bound to disclose it. 
It is notable however, that the requirement for disclosure is not reciprocal. Unlike the 
prosecution, the defence is not under a strict legal obligation to make evidentiary disclosures.  
The Canadian Supreme in R v. Stinchcombe further held that in criminal matters, the Crown 
has an obligation, both in law and procedure rules, to reveal any and all information material 
to the case to an accused. The outcome of investigation by the state is not to be merely exploited 
to pursue conviction at all costs, but rather to ensure justice is done. Nonetheless, the defence 
has not such strict obligation to make reciprocal evidentiary disclosures, and is qualified to 
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take-up a purely adversarial role towards the prosecution. Failure by the prosecution to make 
requisite evidentiary disclosures would impede the ability of the defence to effectively respond, 
effectively stifling the right of an alleged offender to a fair judicial process-a common law right 
which is one of the key pillars of the criminal justice system and which ensures that the innocent 
is not convicted.  
 
The duty to make evidentiary disclosures is a continuing one and is to be updated when further, 
auxiliary or supplemental material or information is received.85 The material to be disclosed 
includes not only that which the prosecution intends to introduce but also that which it does 
not. All statements obtained by the prosecution from individuals who have supplied pertinent 
information are to be revealed to the defence regardless of whether or not the prosecution 
intends to call such persons as witnesses.86 Where statements do not exist, other material, such 
as notes, are to be disclosed or, where there are no such notes, the occupation, address, name, 
and all information prosecution has in relation pertinent evidence that individual may provide, 
are to be passed to the accused.87 Such a strict mandate of the prosecution leaves to question 
the role of defence in evidentiary disclosure. 
 
It would therefore suffice that the Kenya legal system has undergone tremendous revolution 
with the new Constitution.88 The former Constitution had no single provision for disclosure of 
evidence but this can be now seen in Articles 50(2) (j) and Article 35.89 Similarly the former 
Constitution incorporated fundamental rights but there was no precise remedial provision or 
procedure of protecting the rights of citizens whose rights had been infringed.  However, 
currently in Article 23 the High Court has jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 165, to hear 
and determine applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, a 
right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights.90 
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2.2.4 Reciprocity of Disclosure Obligations 
The question of reciprocity with respect to evidentiary disclosure obligation was first dealt with 
in George Ngodhe Juma and Two Others v. The Attorney General.91 While the trial judges did 
not give definitive or definite responses in respect of the same, their statements could be 
construed to imply non-reciprocity. Justice Muga Apondi for instance noted that whereas 
opponents of the disclosure obligations often times argue that such duty should be reciprocal, 
so that the accused too should make adequate disclosures before trial, it is not legally or 
functionally easy to justify such a position merely for the purposes of trying to absolve the 
prosecution of its legal obligation to divulge all material information.  
 
The explanations on disclosure obligations in both George Ngodhe Juma and Two Others v. 
The Attorney General and R v Stinchcombe were adopted and further expounded by the Court 
of Appeal in Thomas Patrick Gilbert Cholmondeley v. R.92 The Bench argued that central to 
Kenya’s criminal trial procedure is the presumption of innocence of the accused as well as the 
constitutional deterrence of compulsion of the accused to provide evidence in proof of their 
innocence. The court held that the burden of proof invariably rests with prosecution and at no 
time does it shift. Arguing for reciprocity would effectively imply a shift of this burden and 
thus a demand that an accused, otherwise presumed innocent, adduce evidence as to their 
innocence or in counter of their presumed guilt. The courts emphasized that since nobody can 
under the law arrest the Republic of Kenya and charge it with a criminal offence so that it 
would require it to be informed of the nature of the offence against it, the question of reciprocity 
of disclosure obligations or level playing field, are as unthinkable as they are misplaced.  
 
Further, the absence of a law specifically conferring powers on a tribunal to compel an accused 
person to make evidentiary disclosures, no such order may issue.93 The appellate court added 
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that such approach creates a dangerous precedent and establishes a rather false and misguided 
theory that what is convenient and would expedite the disposal of a matter is lawful. Such an 
attempt amounts to blatant abuse, disregard and limitation of the right of the accused to fair 
trial as espoused in Article 50 a right that is not subject any limitation, constitutional or 
otherwise.94  The state is definitively the obvious and usual offender against whom protection 
is constitutionally sanctioned and thus it cannot be allowed to demand similar privileges. The 
Appellate Court affirmed that there is not and there can never be a level playing field, or a 
question of reciprocal rights, or any such concept as between the state and an accused person. 
 
The Bench in Cholmondeley case while making reference to Paul Mwangi Murunga v. R,  held 
that it would effectively be incongruous with both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution 
and well established legal principles, procedures and practice to establish a misguided 
jurisprudential principle that the prosecution, like the accused, and in the spirit of misconceived 
fairness, is entitled to demand and receive advance disclosure of evidence from the defence 
and especially, if the accused happens to be wealthy.95 The right of an accused to a fair judicial 
process, like other fundamental human liberties, can only be guarded against those who have 
the unlimited capacity and resources to deprive individuals of their freedom of expression, of 
assembly and of association, freedom of conscience, security of the person, liberty, and right 
to life. That is doubtlessly the state. 
 
It follows that the duty of the prosecution to disclose all evidence material to a case is absolute 
and under no circumstances whatsoever, is the defence under a similar legal duty either in the 
spirit of reciprocity or perceived levelness of the playing field. It is indeed established in 
Kenyan law and illustriously explained in case law that a prosecutor is legally and ethically 
required to submit to court all evidence for consideration irrespective of whether the same 
works against their cause. The duty of the prosecutor, as an agent of the state and the society 
as a whole, is thus not to pander to the individual whims and demands of the victims and 
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complainants not matter how empathically compelling, but rather to impartially and 
dispassionately pursue justice both for the victims as well as the accused. There are however 
situations and circumstances where the duty to make full disclosure may be restricted or 
strategically restrained, albeit with the authorization of the trial court.  
2.3 Witness Protection and Its Ramifications on Fair Trial Guarantees 
Whereas the right to a fair trial is absolute as espoused by Article 25(c), there are certain 
exceptional mitigating circumstances that while not in any way directly a threat to this right or 
limiting at all, require due consideration.96 Such circumstances are oftentimes characterized by 
competing or overlapping liberties effectively requiring a court’s discretionary intervention. 
One such circumstance is protection of witnesses from apprehensible harm or threat of harm.  
2.3.1 Witness Safety and Confidentiality 
Foundational to the facilitation of witness safety in Kenya is the Witness Protection Act.97 This 
law not only makes important distinctive definitions but also outlines circumstances under 
which individuals can be enlisted for state protection. It defines a ‘witness’ to include any 
individual involved in a criminal proceeding, within or outside Kenya, by virtue of having 
given or has agreed to provide evidence, or made a statement in relation a criminal violation 
and requires protection due to a perceived risk or threat.  
 
As illustrated before, openness and fairness of the criminal judicial process is a fundamental 
principle enshrined not just in the Constitution but also redlined in several international 
conventions and treaties ratified by Kenya. Central to this principle is the requirement that 
prosecution evidence and witnesses be made unconditionally available and identifiable not just 
to the accused but the general public as well. It reinforces the ability of the accused to 
effectively present their case and test the prosecution’s case through cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses. In many instances, the open justice system has been found to encourage 
witness involvement. However, in some instances, the principle has been found to be extremely 
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constraining to justice. Organized crime, rape, robbery with violence, terrorism and murder are 
just but a few examples of crimes known to generally have successful prosecutions. For rather 
obvious reasons, witnesses tend to shy away for fear of reprisal. They fear the revelation of 
their identity thanks to the open trial process, which  opens them and their families to the risk 
of harm or backlash either from the associates of the offender or the public generally. The 
primary purpose of witness protection is thus to allay the perceived threats through provision 
of requisite protection. 
2.3.2 Challenges and Complexities 
The interplay between the right to open, fair trial and protection of witnesses from 
apprehensible harm or risk of harm is as delicate as it is complex. On one hand is the 
compulsion to strictly adhere to the McCarthy’s case principle that justice must not only be 
done but must also be seen to have been done effectively requiring full disclosure of 
prosecution evidence including revelation of who exactly are the witnesses to the accused and 
general public. On the other hand, is the need to ensure justice is properly and effectively served 
by encouraging involvement of otherwise scared witnesses through witness protection 
assurance effectively limiting access by the accused and without which protection, the case 
against the accused, however legitimate, would flop leading to an undeserved miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
These pressures and complexities have generated somewhat instructive and insightful judicial 
interpretations and interventions. One such intervention is the interpretation of the 
prosecution’s disclosure obligations to allow for intermittent disclosures which while affording 
the defence time to effectively respond, limits them from pursuing retaliatory tactics on 
prosecution witnesses. While referencing the judgment in Cholmondeley case, the learned 
Judges in Dennis Edmond Apaa and 2 others v. Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission and 
Another, held that the disclosure obligation does not in any way support the supposition that 
all witnesses and evidence must be disclosed in advance of a trial.98 It argued that Article 50 
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(2) (j) guaranteeing the right of the accused to be informed in advance must not be restrictively 
read and construed to imply in advance of trial.99 The court cited R v. Ward,  which held that 
disclosure obligation is a continuing one through the trial and that the duty levied on the court 
is to facilitate a fair and just trial including safeguarding the right of the accused to reasonable 
access to evidence and witnesses.100 The court explained further, that the right of an accused to 
reasonable access to evidence and witnesses must thus be read and construed together with 
other liberties that collectively make up the right to a fair judicial process. 
 
Further, in Thuita Mwangi and 2 Others v. Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission and 3 
Others, High Court Justice Majanja intimated that an accused’s right to be duly furnished and 
familiarized with information the prosecution is keen to relying on at trial is not a one-time 
occurrence but rather a functional requirement that persists through the trial process from the 
commencement of the case to when the accused takes a plea.101 The Judge addressed himself 
to the realities that generally circumscribe any typical trial process. Oftentimes, all the material 
relating to investigation may not be available at the time of charging the suspect or plea taking. 
As such, disclosure of evidence, both exculpatory and inculpatory, is easily dealt with during 
the trial as the duty to provide the material is a continuing one and the trial court is empowered 
to give such orders and directions as may be necessary to effect the right. The court held that 
whenever a fresh material or piece of evidence is provided, the accused is entitled to have 
adequate time, opportunity and facilities to effectively prepare their defence. 
 
The courts are instinctively aware of the possible implications of threat of witnesses to fair and 
impartial dispensation of justice. It is on the premise of this appreciation that they constantly 
and consistently seek to establish a balance between the right to disclosure and the need for 
protection of witnesses from any potential harm. Court of Appeal Justices Omolo, Otieno and 
O’Kubasu in the Cholmondeley case demonstrated awareness of such possibility and the 
potential difficulties and observed that whereas an accused has an absolute entitlement to a just 
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process including the right to access evidence and witnesses, certain circumstances, in public 
interest and in the interest of justice, require non-disclosure or redacted disclosure of names, 
addresses and occupations of a particular witness or witnesses. However, such reductions and 
non-disclosure must not be deliberately done to blindside the defence or in a manner that makes 
it nearly impossible for an accused to effectively respond. The reductions must not be so 
significantly material as to occasion injustice to the accused and at the same time not so loose 
as to compromise the identity of witnesses.  
 
The question as to whether protection of witnesses in consonance with the Witness Protection 
Act infringes on the right of an alleged offender to open and fair judicial process as enshrined 
in the Constitution was definitively dealt with in R v. Kevin Ouma Omondi and 4 others.102 The 
High Court in Homabay held that the right to open public trial can be restricted to safeguard 
the safety of witnesses. The prosecution sought an order for witness protection allowing a 
witness to testify in camera but also seeking reduction of witness statements before service on 
the accused ostensibly to hide witness’s identity. In support of the prosecution’s application 
was a risk assessment report on a witness prepared by a protection officer from the Witness 
Protection Agency (WPA).The assessment observed that the witness was invariably at danger 
on account of the evidence he had agreed to provide against the accused. Additionally, the 
protection officer noted that the fact that the crime involved a politically instigated murder, 
apprehension of danger and risk of a similarly politically instigated reprisal was undeniable. 
The accused vehemently opposed the application pleading that the intended use of pseudonyms 
to conceal the identity of the witness as well as redact witness statement would be prejudicial 
and heavily constrain his ability to adequately respond effectively infringing on his right to a 
fair trial. The prosecution pegged its application on Section 4 which provides that: “The witness 
protection agency may request the court to hold proceedings in camera or closed sessions, use 
pseudonymous on the witness, reduction of identity information of witness use of video link or 
distort the identity of a witness.”103 
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The court held that while the Constitution provided for the right to a fair trial including a right 
to public hearing, that provision cannot be read in isolation but alongside other constitutional 
human liberties provisions.104  In particular, Article 50 (8) requiring shielding of witnesses and 
persons at risk.105 Satisfied that the apprehension of danger was undeniably real and that no 
question had been asked in at the trial which would have provided information leading to the 
divulgence of the safeguarded identity of the witness or his residence, Lady Justice Omondi 
allowed the application and directed that the witness statements be redacted and the witness 
not only be placed under witness protection but also testify in camera. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the right to fair trial has its foundation on well-established 
universal principles of human rights and fundamental liberties. Core to its protection, 
promotion and realization is the doctrine of presumption of innocence that demands that the 
trial process be conducted rather dispassionately and in an inquisitive manner as opposed to a 
unidirectional way aimed only at finding evidence to prove the guilt of an accused. Ideally, the 
prosecution in furtherance of this right is required to assume an accused innocence and 
consequently endeavour to find and adduce any all and evidence material to the case 
irrespective of whether same favours or disfavours the accused.  
 
Despite the best of wills and intentions however, implementation of these global principles is 
contingent on strong and dependable local institutions and frameworks. Even then, 
independence must be guaranteed and clarity of the legal texts emphasized as ambiguities and 
generalities often incentivize mediocrity and non-compliance. On this premise alone, it is 
arguably accurate to surmise that the domestic legal framework is pretty clear on the 
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absoluteness of the right to fair trial. However, failure of specificity as to what that means and 
especially if it is nuanced with other competing interests and contingencies such as witness 
safety and confidentiality, leaves room for errors and misguidance. It is common knowledge 
that judicial interpretations on important legal concepts and principles can be as varied as the 
persons giving them sometimes even negating the very spirit of the law.  To this end, it is safe 
to say that while the domestic legal and policy framework is adequately equipped at 
guaranteeing an accused right to fair trial, it is still weak at ensuring justice thanks to weak 
witness protection mechanisms. In text, the WPA is incredibly progressive and foul-proof. In 
application however, it remains weak and ineffective. 
 
The foregoing undeniably demonstrates that the right of an accused to a fair and open judicial 
process is absolute and the prosecution is strictly obligated, both legally and ethically, to 
provide facilities and make adequate evidentiary disclosures to allow the accused prepare their 
case. This disclosure obligation is not a one-off exercise but rather a functional requirement 
that persists throughout the trial process. Such disclosure must be made non-selectively and 
must include both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. Suppression of evidence therefore 
amounts to infringement on the right to fair trial, and if established, may lead to an acquittal 
and subsequent pursuit of a malicious prosecution case against the state.  
The right to fair trial must however be balanced with the competing need to protect witnesses 
as a matter of public policy and just judicial process. Evidence and testimonies may thus be 
redacted in instances where full disclosure would otherwise expose witnesses to potential 
threats or risk of harm. Such reductions must however be made in a way that do not make it 
extremely difficult for the accused to respond. Having looked into the interplay between the 
right to fair trial and the need to protect witnesses from potential harm, the next chapter 
analyses international rules and policy framework on exculpatory evidence with close reference 
to the rules of procedure as well as case law emanating from the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and 
International Criminal Court (ICC). 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVE 
3.0 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the interplay between witness protection and the right to fair trial is 
as delicate as it is complex. The trial process must be shielded from any potential abuse from 
either of parties. On one side is to safeguard the defence’s need to challenge prosecution 
evidence and question witnesses. The other is the need to protect the identity and confidentiality 
of some witnesses if exposure to the accused is likely to endanger their lives. The difficulty 
lies in the determination of the existence of danger as well as ascertainment of disclosures 
likely to render witnesses vulnerable. Even then, the duty to prevent prosecutorial overreach 
through insistence that the right to fair trial is absolute and incontrovertible is ironclad. Any 
attempt at shielding witnesses from direct cross-examination by the accused on account of 
perceived harm or threat of harm must be sufficiently substantiated. Conversely, a trial court 
has to acknowledge and give credence to all matters ancillary to a trial including the possibility 
of retaliation on the victims and witnesses by the accused or their sympathizers on account of 
their testimonies.  
 
This Chapter endeavours to build a deeper understanding into these nuances as well as further 
the necessary discourse on the subject matter. It specifically turns the spotlight to international 
criminal judicial processes where the nuances are even more pronounced. It tests further the 
study’s hypothesis that non-disclosure of evidence amounts to a violation of accused’s right to 
fair trial. However, unlike the previous chapter, it tests this through examination of related rules 
of procedure and evidence governing the right to fair trial at major international criminal 
tribunals and international court specifically the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The choice of these international criminal tribunals as opposed to any 
others for example the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Court of Senegal is that jurisprudence is informed by the fact that generally, tribunals 
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tend not to reflect a single inherent borrowed practice that often times vary, but rather are 
representative of an amalgamation of practices that provide a more nuanced and averaged 
collective consideration. Thus, they are likely too rich and dense in insightful amalgamation of 
jurisprudential principles and practices. Furthermore these two African tribunals have little to 
offer in relation to the thesis. Part 3.1 of the chapter provides an overview of the international 
court and tribunals. Parts 3.2 and 3.3 not only examines the equality of arms principle and its 
role in international due process but also discusses the interplay between the right to fair trial 
and disclosure of exculpatory evidence at the international arena. Part 3.4 analyses the 
implications of international court structures on prosecutorial evidentiary disclosure 
obligations. Lastly, Parts 3.5 and 3.6 look into the challenges faced by the tribunals and 
international in dealing with exculpatory evidence and implications of witness safety and 
confidentiality on disclosure obligations respectively. 
3.1 Overview of the International Court and Tribunals 
Interrogation of operationalization of rules of evidence and procedure targeted primarily at 
promoting and protecting the right of an accused to fair trial is incomplete without a critical 
foundational understanding of the mandate of institutions established to apply them. The 
functions, objectives of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
are addressed here. It explains the principle of equality of arms and its incorporation into both 
the tribunals and ICC.  
 
3.1.1 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Before the ICC and the ICTR was the ICTY. Established in 1993 following numerous reports 
and outcries to the UN on widespread human rights violations and mass murders in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Croatia, the ICTY was mandated with the onerous task of prosecuting the 
responsible political leaders.106 It faced a huge challenge. Being the first international tribunal 
                                                          
106 'About The ICTY | International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' (Icty.org, 2019) 
<http://www.icty.org/en/about> accessed 15 April, 2019. 
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to be established in nearly fifty years, the ICTY did not have access to precedents on how to 
effectively handle procedural and evidentiary issues.107 The judges had to carefully, and in the 
most prudent way possible, determine the most appropriate way to include evidence.  Further, 
they were mandated with the seemingly impossible task of reining in powerful and dangerous 
government and military operatives previously deemed untouchable.108 In response, the ICTY 
created rather elaborate principle-based rules that centred on the critical aspects of proceedings 
as well as the rights of the accused. These rules not only established a level of predictable result 
and efficient trial process but also entrenched respect for the right of the accused to fair trial.109 
 
3.1.2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up by the Security Council in 
1995, three years before the ICC, in response to crimes of genocide and human rights 
infringements in Rwanda.110 In comparison to the ICTY, the durations of the transgressions the 
ICTR dealt with was much briefer. Its precedents, along with those of ICTY have been 
significantly instrumental in the development of credibility and reliability of international 
criminal justice system and jurisprudence.111 Whereas many of the evidentiary and procedure 
rules applied by the ICTR were modelled along those of ICTY, the ICTR became the first to 
provide in-depth and insightful interpretation of case-law and especially, those concerned with 
genocide. The ICTR not only prosecuted high-ranking military officials and politicians but also 
tried influential religious leaders and rogue journalists responsible for the distribution and 
broadcasting of material that fuelled the atrocities in Rwanda.112 The tribunal left an indelible 
mark on international criminal practice, pioneered safety measures that empowered witnesses 
to unreservedly testify, and demonstrated that individual bearing the most responsibility for 
                                                          
107Carter L and Pocar F, International Criminal Procedure, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, 73. 
108Sznajder R, ‘Provisional Release at the ICTY: Rights of The Accused and the Debate That Amended a Rule’ 11 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 3, 2013, 114-122. 
109Carter L and Pocar F. 
110 'The ICTR In Brief | United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda' (Unictr.irmct.org, 2019) 
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111Malekian F, Jurisprudence of International Criminal Justice, 1ed, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 27-33. 
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transgressions could be apprehended, their position and status in life and society 
notwithstanding.113 
 
3.1.3 International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Established in 1998 under the aegis of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (the 
Rome Statute) as a reaction to the need of the international community to establish permanent 
international court to handle crimes national legal systems are either incapable or reluctant of 
handling, more so crimes against humanity114, the ICC functions as a an autonomous legal 
entity but oftentimes collaborates with global organizations like the United Nations (UN).115  
The court comprises three branches namely: appeals, trial, and pre-trial. Collectively, these 
divisions are served by 18 members of the bench.116 The Rome Statute not only confers 
jurisdiction on the court, but it also allows it to actively  carry out investigations of offences on 
referral by the UN, a party state and upon receipt of  related communication on a state’s 
unwillingness or inability to investigate and prosecute alleged international crimes.117  The 
courts rapidly rising caseload has seen it rely heavily on precedents of the ICTR and the ICTY. 
Kenya domesticated the Rome Statute through the enactment of the International Crimes Act 
in 2008.118 The crimes that can be prosecuted under the Act are genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.119 The High Court shall have jurisdiction to try a person who is 
alleged to have committed any of the mentioned offences and punished in Kenya for that 
offence.120  
                                                          
113'The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda'.  
114Klamberg M, 'What Are The Objectives Of International Criminal Procedure? - Reflections on the Fragmentation of 
a Legal Regime’ 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 2, 2010, 279-302. 
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118 Act No.16 of 2008. 
119 Section 6, International Crimes Act. 
120 Section 8, International Crimes Act. 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Principle of Equality of Arms and its role in international due process 
Common and central to the evidentiary rules and procedure across ICTY, ICTR and ICC, is 
the principle of equality of arms. The principle was first formulated and operationalized by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) - a court established under the Convention for 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (The Convention) to protect fundamental liberties 
in Europe.121 The principle espouses that parties to a dispute, criminal or otherwise, have and 
must provide a “reasonable opportunity” to put on their case.122 It thus not only encompasses 
an accused’s right to a fair trial but also includes an accused right of access to exculpatory 
evidence. Unsurprisingly, the principle was adopted by the UN and is a common thread that 
runs through the terms of reference of major international UN-sanctioned tribunals including 
ICTR and ICTY.123 It is a fundamental component of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Rome Statue which established and superintends the ICC.124 
 
Whereas the ECHR is only applicable to European countries that subscribe to it, the United 
Nations appropriated its principle of equality of arms in the ICCPR.125 The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights postulations adopt equality of arms, quite similar to 
liberties circumscribed in the Kenyan Constitution’s Bill of Rights.126 No ICCPR provision 
definitely and clearly identifies the evidence that is necessary to facilitate defence preparations, 
but unquestionably, exculpatory material establishing the innocence of an accused would be, 
if available, and necessary. This principle was also co-opted by the Rome Statute.127 
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3.3 Right to fair Trial and Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence in International Court 
and Tribunals 
As discussed before, operations of international justice systems and the judicial processes 
established thereupon are hinged primarily on the principle of equality of arms demanding that 
the right of an alleged offender to fair judicial process be protected and promoted at all times. 
This part not only describes the rules of divulgence of exculpatory evidence in ICTY, ICTR 
and ICC but also underscores the implications of the structures of these judicial bodies on the 
application of the same. 
 
3.3.1 International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the ICTY was governed by its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. The first rule specifically obligated the prosecutor to make full evidentiary disclosure 
irrespective of whether the same was inculpatory or exculpatory.128 It however, allowed for an 
exception for disclosure in the circumstances where it could be demonstrated that such 
disclosures had a higher likelihood of affecting public or security interest of any state or were 
likely to prejudice on-going or further investigations into the alleged crime. 
 
The second rule on the other hand, belaboured the significance of the role of the prosecution 
and the immediacy of the need for evidentiary disclosures.129 It mandated the prosecution to 
disclose, soonest possible, as to any material evidence were likely to suggest innocence of the 
accused or mitigated an accused’s guilt or impacted the reliability of prosecution evidence. The 
prosecution was however shielded from having to provide sufficient proof that it adequately 
satisfied its disclosure obligations. Comparatively, an accused was expected to rely on the 
evidence disclosed by the prosecution as a good-faith gesture. If dissatisfied, he was to make a 
request for disclosure and demonstrate to court failure of disclosure on the part of the 
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prosecution. To a larger extent therefore, the determination as to the materiality of evidence, 
exculpatory or otherwise, was purely a prosecutor’s exercise of good-faith discretion. 
 
The ICTY’s disclosure rules were interpreted and refined in Prosecutor v. Karadzic.130 The 
trial court held that, in proof of an alleged non-compliance of the prosecution with the 
established evidentiary disclosure obligations, an accused was to not only identify the evidence 
or materials entreated from the prosecution but also prove a prima facie case that the sought 
out items were not just material to their defence but were also in the custody or control of the 
prosecution. The tribunal went ahead to define “material evidence” to mean items upon whose 
reliance, the defendant had some prospect of success. It did not however define what 
constituted “prospects of success”.  
 
The court reaffirmed the importance of Rule 66 in not only reinforcing the equality of arms 
principle but also in ensuring fairness of the trial process. It held that in instances where 
otherwise exculpatory evidence was known and immediately and easily accessible to the 
accused, the prosecution could not be compelled to make such otherwise obvious disclosures. 
This is within the local legal parlance, known as the due diligence rule. Additionally, the 
prosecution’s evidentiary disclosure obligations did not arise automatically even instances 
where it could be shown that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory information. The 
trial chamber clarified that withdrawal of witnesses and any and all evidence associated with 
and thus reliant on their testimony was, in and of itself, sufficient non-disclosure remedy.131 
 
Even in instances where the office of the prosecution was found to have violated its disclosure 
obligations, the associated sanctions in the form of warnings or punishments were directed not 
to individual prosecutors in breach but rather the office of the prosecutor as a collective unit. 
Such a determination was made in Prosecutor v. Lukic following the accused’s application for 
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redress emanating from infringement of disclosure requirements by the prosecution.132 The 
Appeals Chamber reminded the prosecution of the significance of its duty to disclose evidence 
and reiterated its expectation of the prosecution to take measures to ameliorate any future 
occurrences of such violations. 
 
3.3.2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Disclosure requirements of the ICTR were governed by Rule 66 (B).133 The requirements were 
very similar to those of ICTY and obligated the prosecutor to make disclosures notwithstanding 
the possibility of the accused not relying on the same to advance their case. Nonetheless, the 
rules demanded that an accused advance claims of infringement for the Trial Chamber to issue 
a compliance directive under Rule 66(B), notwithstanding the fact that it is the duty of 
prosecutors to make disclosures. The rules called on the accused to not only know but to also 
reveal the specific evidence not divulged by the prosecution. The defence faced a reduced 
standard if it made demands for an inquest into whether the prosecution contravened Rule 
66(B), instead of a directive from the Trial Chamber requiring the prosecution to redress a 
claimed infringement.134 
 
It is notable however, that like the ICTY, the ICTR lacked a general rule on what amounted to 
exculpatory evidence, effectively requiring the tribunal to make case-by-case decisions. 
Generally, witness testimonies that were hitherto contradictory to prosecution’s claims or 
impugned the authenticity of the prosecution witnesses themselves were deemed 
exculpatory.135 Similarly evidence of information relevant to an accused’s case including but 
not limited to alibis or failure to link the accused to the alleged crime was also exculpatory. 
Accordingly, the remedy for failure of the prosecution to make disclosures varied 
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inconsistently across cases and hinged heavily on how favourably the tribunal viewed an 
accused’s case.136 
 
3.3.3 International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The rules of evidence and procedure that underpin ICC’s effective discharge of mandate are 
governed by the Rome Statute. The Statute expressly grants an accused person the right to 
access evidence that mitigates their guilt and which may impugn the authenticity and soundness 
of prosecution evidence.137 Oftentimes, and particularly in incidences where exculpatory 
evidence is undetermined, Statute’s applicability unsettled, circumspection is left to the court 
to assess the applicability of the specific Article of the Statute138. 
 
Additionally, and in the strongest language possible the Statute, in describing the prosecutor’s 
investigative authority, states that the prosecutor has strict legal obligation to investigate any 
and all claims, including those likely to discharge an accused.139 This language is arguably 
stronger than those of the ICTY and ICTR as well as the postulations of the Constitution or any 
other domestic Kenyan laws. Nonetheless, the court (ICC) still lacks clear guidelines on 
specific applicability of this provision. Scholars and experts have argued that its case laws are 
replete with rulings on broad procedural questions but, unlike the tribunals, very lean on 
specificity.140 It however, takes a stricter approach on providing of exculpatory evidence in 
redacted format as witnessed in some recent cases.141 
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In Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang for example, the court determined that the prosecutor’s election 
to suppress documents containing potentially exculpatory material and information from both 
the accused and the Trial Chamber amounted to a serious and wholesale misapplication and 
infraction of a major proviso which was intentioned at allowing the prosecution to obtain 
evidence privately, and in very restrictive conditions.142 The accused persons were charged 
with crimes against humanity committed in Kenya. The prosecution withheld nearly two 
hundred and twelve documents containing exculpatory evidence on the basis of confidentiality. 
As the ICC proceeds to try cases, it needs to address itself to the determinations of other 
international tribunals in ascertaining the material and information that should be divulged. 
3.4 Implications of International Criminal Court and Tribunals Structures on 
Prosecution’s Disclosure Obligations 
The case for a robustly effective methodology in providing defence lawyers unrestrained access 
to prosecution evidence, including possibly exculpatory ones, is doubtlessly self-evident. On 
the premise of equality of arms principle alone, an accused has all the rights to a fair trial as 
well as a fair opportunity to effectively advance his case. Without access to exculpatory 
evidence, an accused has an incredibly onerous and arduous task to mount a defence than if he 
had it. The strains defence lawyers face in international criminal justice system to procure 
favourable evidence is thus fairly similar to the due diligence rule predominantly applied in 
adversarial systems such as Kenya and the United States (U.S).  
 
As highlighted before, the due diligence rule provides that where an accused can locate 
evidence with the least amount of effort, then non-divulgence of the same by the prosecution 
cannot be construed as a violation of disclosure obligations. The challenge with the application 
of this rule is that the adversarial nature of trials generally incentivizes the prosecution and the 
defence to openly take part in what can only be described as a “hide and seek” game instead of 
a constructive and beneficial discovery measures and to the disadvantage of fair process. 
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It is noteworthy that neither the ICTY, ICTR nor ICC conform to specific national system of 
criminal judicial practice to best reflect the variety of nations and legal systems they try.143 
Rather, they mash-up elements of common law’s adversarial legal framework with civil law 
system’s inquisitorial framework to create a more balanced and widely-accepted set of 
principles of criminal justice, procedure and rules. Critics however, accused ICTY prosecutors 
of leaning more towards adversarial approach in their trial of war crimes effectively implying 
the prosecutors worked less to uncover the truth of what happened and more to merely prove 
cases against the defence. This scenario was fuelled by vagueness of the language adopted for 
the tribunal’s Standard of Professional Conduct.144 Like the ICC, the ICTY’s Standard of 
Professional Conduct comprises multiple postulations on a prosecutor’s obligation to protect 
and guarantee privacy of any witnesses who testify, effectively providing justification for any 
prosecutorial action that could otherwise be construed as failure to make evidentiary 
disclosures to the accused.145 
 
3.5 Challenges faced by International Criminal Tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court in Dealing with Exculpatory Evidence 
As already established, the rules governing classification and determination of evidentiary 
items that qualify as exculpatory in ICTY, ICTR and ICC are helplessly vague oftentimes 
requiring interpretation for application by the respective trial chambers. This calls for a deeper 
evaluation to establish the causes of these misgivings. This part not only looks into the salient 
features of exculpatory evidence including categorization and materiality and how the same 
can hinder disclosure but also lays out ways through which the international courts and 
tribunals can best improve prosecutorial disclosure obligations. 
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The question of materiality of evidence has been found to generally stifle disclosure due to the 
perceived limited effect in changing the potential results.146 In effect, rather than deter 
prosecutors from perpetuating non-disclosure, it incentivizes them due to the absence of real 
consequences. This section concludes by explaining the challenge faced by the accused in 
learning about the existence of exculpatory evidence and how such limitation directly affects 
their ability to prove non-disclosure. 
 
3.5.1 Classification of Exculpatory Evidence 
Within the realms of international criminal justice system, providing clarity to existing rules of 
evidence and procedure is doubtlessly the first step towards remedying systemic ineffectual 
prosecutorial evidentiary disclosure. In as much as inadequate and ineffectual prosecutorial 
deterrence remains critical an issue, it is imperative that rules on disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence be clear enough to any reasonable persons including prosecutors to eliminate excuses 
for non-compliance. 
 
In the ICTY for instance, rules of discovery demanded classification of evidence into three 
distinct categories with equally distinct disclosure requirements. These included: tangible 
materials that were “material” to an accused’s preparation, exculpatory information, and basic 
threshold information.147 Despite the existence of these classifications in the rules of evidence, 
case-by-case judicial determination as to what amounted to exculpatory evidence was still a 
necessity.148 The rules should however classify the scope of exculpatory evidence before 
explaining what it would exactly mean for evidence to be deemed as exculpatory; similar to 
the way ICTY determined that evidence required within the meaning of Rule 68 did not have 
to be exculpatory at face value, but that material and information that may seem exculpatory 
should be divulged.149 It would thus be nearly impracticable if not impossible to effectively 
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determine when exculpatory evidence must be disclosed. Nonetheless, categorization of such 
evidence helps expedite court’s determinations. Even then, case-by-case determinations roots 
out the element of predictability of outcome effectively requiring significant time for review 
and decision.  
 
Generally, due to unforeseeable limitations, the tribunals and the trial chamber prefer specific 
evidentiary requests over broad ones. However, broad pre-determined evidentiary 
categorization of exculpatory material is likely to assist the ICC make preliminary decisions 
when an accused seeks specific orders. It is doubtlessly easier for the Trial Chamber to ascertain 
whether the prosecution deliberately suppressed evidence key to an accused’s case once 
exculpatory and materiality of evidence has been determined.150 This would not only save time 
and costs but also ameliorate the difficulties often faced by the defence in determining the exact 
categories within which their requests and applications fall. Additionally, it makes it less 
arduous for the trial chamber to make preliminary determinations as to whether or not the 
rationales for withholding evidence qualify as exceptions to the general rule. Accordingly, the 
prosecution can successfully obtain evidence in instances where safety of witness or 
confidentiality of sources is paramount.151 
 
Some of the prosecutorial evidentiary categorizations likely to require confidentiality and 
protection and thus redactions include: evidence that contradicts or impeaches prosecution 
witnesses or evidence of alternative explanations or justifications, evidence related to defences 
raised, evidence of alternative explanations or justifications, and witness statements, including 
any questioning by the prosecution or subsequent testimonies. Due to the availability of 
precedents touching on each of the categories, an accused would be able to accurately place 
their case between cases where the court held the evidence demanded divulgence or not, 
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effectively establishing some degree of predictability minimizing the need for further review 
by the Trial Chamber.152 
 
Materiality of Evidence 
In addition to exculpation, international criminal tribunals and courts consider materiality of 
evidence adduced before them. In ICTY for instance, evidence was considered material if it 
exhibited what the rules described as “some prospect of success”.153 The tribunal did not 
however provide a sufficiently clear description or interpretation of this phrase. Rather, it 
merely explained it to mean evidence “supporting a colourable argument” causing further 
confusion and uncertainty in rules of procedure and evidence.154 In Prosecutor v. Karadzic, the 
trial-chamber asserted that merely arguing that there was evidence of an alleged agreement 
between the U.S. and the accused was inadequate, but indicated that had the accused explained 
what the nature of the arrangement was and the form it took, that may have been adequate to 
meet the threshold. 155 
 
In ICTR, materiality of evidence was judged on the premise of its relevance to an accused’s 
preparation. Still, the concept of preparation is admittedly wide-sweeping requiring further 
refinement notwithstanding the fact that materiality is generally superseded by the demand that 
the evidence would influence the final decision.156 As this is barely the case, it is unnecessary 
to conduct further investigations. Materiality question generally reduces evidentiary analysis 
to a numbers game.157 The ICC in the Ruto and Sang Case for instance determined that despite 
the glaring failure on the part of the prosecution to make sufficient evidentiary disclosures in 
nearly nine instances, that failure was not so tragic or procedurally dire as to warrant 
appointment of a disclosure officer to conduct further investigations.158 The court directed itself 
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to the fact that the nine disclosure failings, if juxtaposed with the numerous evidentiary pages 
and items already disclosed by the prosecution, had limited influence on the final decision.  
 
The trial court’s determination on materiality in Ruto and Sang Case was, in this study’s 
opinion, as dangerous as it was naïve.  Its import is that the prosecution can make several   
disclosures only to hold on to a few crucial potentially exculpatory evidence from an accused 
merely on account of relativity; that the undisclosed evidence is not numerically substantial 
enough to meet disclosure violation threshold. Ideally, the focus should be more on the value 
or quality of the withheld or undisclosed evidence and less on the ratio of the disclosed to 
undisclosed evidence. 
 
3.5.3 Ineffective Deterrence to Disclosure Violations 
The biggest limitation to effective implementation of evidentiary disclosure rules in 
international criminal justice system is lack of elaborate and enforceable deterrent penalties for 
violations. This is arguably due to the overlap of a variety of factors and circumstances that 
generally circumscribe such violations. Sufficiency of remedy let alone enforceability remains 
another big challenge. The ICTY for instance focuses primarily on the harm such non-
disclosures are likely to occasion an accused in determining sufficiency of remedy. In 
Prosecutor v. Stakic159 for instance, the prosecution withheld material evidence contrary to 
Rule 68160 despite numerous appeals and requests from the accused. The accused was 
eventually able to access the withheld information and items of evidence and used them to not 
only recall witnesses but also interrogated them on the premise of the discovery. The tribunal 
asserted that the eventual access to the otherwise unavailable evidence by the accused was 
sufficient to render mute and repugnant any claims of violations on the part of the 
prosecution.161 
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Likewise, the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Mpambara  allowed the prosecution to proceed with an 
application for a delayed motion to redact evidence on account of confidentiality and witness 
safety.162 The prosecution had heavily redacted important and starkly material portions of 
evidence before making disclosures to the accused or seeking authority from the court to make 
redactions. Their primary concern, and thus failure to adhere to strict procedural requirements, 
was the safety of witnesses which they feared would have been jeopardized as the witnesses 
were easily identifiable from the un-redacted documents. This violation clearly went 
unsanctioned. When faced with questions of disclosure violations and the associated possible 
punishments, the trial chamber chose to focus instead on the effect of the disclosure on the 
accused’s case. This approach is arguably counterproductive and negates the real intention of 
the evidentiary rules since it reviews a prosecutor’s otherwise unlawful conduct on a fortuitous 
basis-regardless of its influence on the outcome, rather than assessing the transgression separate 
from the result. 
 
Such approach to enforcement of rules wrongly and misguidedly affirms the notion that the 
prosecutor was amenable to punishment only if the outcome had been different or if there was 
no way to offer the defence a remedy. It encourages and incentivizes the prosecution to 
continue withholding crucial evidence safe in the knowledge that the accused would not be 
advance their cause in the absence such exculpatory evidence; and that a recourse exists for the 
accused should they discover that evidence was suppressed; or, that the accused may be 
oblivious of the fact that evidence was suppressed.163 
 
Effective and sustainable deterrence of violation of disclosure obligations, even in 
circumstances where the same may not have a significant impact on an accused’s case, is only 
possible if harsher penalties are meted. This begins with the ICC and other international 
criminal tribunals making sure their evidentiary rules are free of ambiguity and are as clear, 
concise and straightforward as possible. Notably, unlike the ICC, the ICTR and ICTY had 
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fairly clearer rules and procedures for general disclosures as well as for divulgence of 
exculpatory evidence, effectively acknowledging the importance of evidence for both parties, 
more so the accused.164 Even then, as things stand, the trial chamber is precluded from 
punishing individual prosecutors for disclosure violations. Unless the error is irredeemably 
egregious, only the office of the prosecutor can be sanctioned as a collective unit. Given the 
trial chambers’ common disinclination to recognize infringements justifying some sort of 
sanctions, the prosecutor remains undeterred from any other or further violations.   
 
Unlike in the ICC, ICTY and ICTR, a robust and progressive system of deterrence of disclosure 
violations can be found in Kenya and other adversarial systems such as the U.S. Courts in these 
jurisdictions demonstrably display little to no patience for non-disclosures. In the U.S. for 
instance, the prosecutor is amenable to individualized ethical violations on their record with 
the same being publicly accessible to everyone.165 It is thus a careless professional risk for a 
prosecutor in such a country to flagrantly commit non-disclosure violation. Justice Kozinski in 
United States v. Olsen166 observed that in the unusual case that non-disclosed evidence 
becomes known, the implications generally leaves the prosecution no not any better than if it 
had abided by Brady  ab initio.167 In the event that violation is found to be material, the 
prosecution gets a do-over; making it no worse off than if it had disclosed the evidence in the 
first place. Comparatively, non-disclosure in Kenya, if established, is sufficient grounds for 
acquittal especially on appeal.  
 
Disclosure violations at the international criminal justice system persist due to failure of the 
courts emphasize the importance of full evidentiary disclosure to the prosecution as well as 
explain the consequences of non-compliance. To this end, introduction of ethical standards 
directly hinged on prosecutor’s faithfulness to disclosure obligations as seen in the U.S, has a 
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higher likelihood of making the rule more effective in the international arena. In comparison 
to state or national cases where individual prosecutors are barely known to the general public 
and cases are just between the state and equally unknown individuals, the attention 
international criminal cases command puts pressure on individual prosecutors to act above 
board. Introduction of sanctions for non-disclosure with personal liability as opposed to 
collective liability would see a higher rate of compliance among prosecutors. To ensure justice 
is done to victims of crime, prosecutors have to achieve convictions without violating rules of 
procedure as that would only cast aspersions as to the validity of the verdict.  
 
Caution however must be taken, to make certain that such pressure does not mislead the 
prosecutor into securing conviction at all costs at the expense of justice and due process or to 
merely fulfil a populist agenda. Transgression of due process takes place when suppression 
happens, notwithstanding the existence of regressive measures for the same.168 Failure to 
operationalize any significant consequences creates a bad procedural example and, while the 
same may be nearly immaterial in an isolated case, there is very little to show that a similar 
misapplication would not result in far more significant implications in the future. 
 
3.5.4 Burden of Disclosing Exculpatory Evidence 
The rules of procedure and evidence of ICC, ICTY and ICTR all rest the burden on disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence on the prosecution.169 The prosecutor is strictly obligated to not only 
notify the accused but also share where with them any and all evidence the prosecution has 
found, exculpatory or not. Thus, the responsibility of notifying the trial court of any disclosure-
violations rests solely with the accused, possibly due to the fact that it is doubtlessly the party 
most disenfranchised by non-disclosure. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the defence 
to establish a prima facie case that the prosecution withheld information, items or evidentiary 
materials material to their case. This they must achieve by having evidence to prove that the 
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prosecution is in custody of material otherwise unavailable to both themselves and the trial 
court. 
 
The right to exculpatory evidence was however first diluted by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. 
Blaškic where the court described the exact phrasing of application for release of exculpatory 
evidence failing to acknowledge the fact that oftentimes the accused lacks specific knowledge 
of the content of such evidence and can only speak in generalities and make broad requests in 
respect thereof.170 Even in instances where an accused establishes a prima facie case for the 
existence of such evidence, the other numerous previously discussed limitations and 
protections offered to the prosecution reduces any chances of eventual success. This implicitly 
burdens the defence to work harder than is ordinarily necessary just to access information and 
material it has a right to from the outset. 
 
3.6 Non-disclosure On Account of National Security and Witness Safety 
As already established, the prosecution at the international criminal court and tribunals are 
obligated to make evidentiary disclosures as a general rule. There are however, exceptional 
circumstances that necessitate non-disclosures. The burden placed on the prosecution and the 
high-profile nature of their work oftentimes call for exercise of utmost restraint, patience and 
confidence as the most crucial and game-changing evidence are not always available unless 
promises are made to protect the sources. 
 
Presently, implementation of exceptions to the disclosure rules in the ICC is made on case-by-
case basis. Experts are unanimous that this approach is particularly as strategic as it is important 
since without it, the redress for non-disclosure would be inadequate especially in the face of 
competition between confidentiality and full evidentiary divulgence.171 Care must however be 
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taken to avert any misuse of these exceptions. Confidentiality on account of national safety or 
witness protection should only be used by the prosecutor to gather information that is partly 
crucial to a trial but must not in and of itself be the premise of the case in its entirety.172 
3.6.1 Confidentiality in ICTY 
As a matter of practice, the ICTY generally allowed the prosecution to withhold evidence on 
the premise that the materials were provided by either witnesses whose safety on account of 
such disclosure was likely to be compromised or states to whom such releases were a matter 
of national security.173 These exceptions however applied only to items material to the 
concerned cases.174 Rule 67(A) (ii) stipulates that disclosure was only required if the defence 
consented to reciprocity.175 An accused was thus required to supply the prosecution with 
testimonies of their prospective witnesses. These encompassed statements taken by third 
parties in the custody of the defence. As a reaction to prosecution’s request for confidentiality, 
the defence generally argued that evidence fell within the larger classification of basic-
threshold information, effectively requiring unilateral unreserved divulgence from the 
prosecution.176 
 
The tribunal in the Blaškić case broadened the definition what constituted “prior statements of 
the accused” beyond what was textually permissible in the evidentiary rules. This was later 
followed by actual amendment of Rule 66 in 1999 to accommodate the holding.177 The phrase 
was now broadened to include testimonies of the accused obtained in the course of 
interrogation during any type of judicial process. The effect of this change was quite prominent 
in the immediately following case law. The tribunal leaned more towards a stricter 
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interpretation of what constituted prior statements. Effectively, more communications, items 
and documentations could be withheld under the guise of confidentiality. 
 
One instance that justifiably warranted invocation of the disclosure exception in the ICTY was 
the use of evidence of mass graves in Bosnia to prove the atrocities alleged to have been 
committed.178  The U.S. government had satellite imagery of the actual graves it was inclined 
to provide to the prosecution but only on condition of confidentiality and anonymity. At the 
time, the satellite technology was so crucial to the U.S. government that disclosures on the 
international stage in respect of the same were as unthinkable as it was dangerous. It was 
certainly a matter of national security. The insistence of the U.S. on confidentiality and privacy 
as a precursor and a prerequisite for the disclosure sparked future amendment of the disclosure 
rules to incorporate even more narrower rules against disclosure.  
 
The tribunal’s attempt to protect confidentiality, guarantee safety of witnesses and thus 
maintain good relations with the sources severely constrained the fundamental rights and 
liberties of an accused.179 An accused was in effect given little to no notice or opportunity to 
rebut evidence clearly material to their defence. This in addition to other already discussed 
procedural limitations and bottlenecks only helped to further suppress an accused already-
limited right. 
3.6.2 Confidentiality and privacy in ICC 
It is noteworthy that the decisions of ICTY on the question of non-disclosure on account of 
confidentiality both for national security and witness safety concerns set the stage for the ICC. 
This was conspicuously evident in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo where the prosecutors 
leveraged the uncertainty of the wording of the rules of disclosure to their build their case 
against the accused, and to the disenfranchisement of the accused.180 Article 54(3)(e) confers 
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on the prosecutor the freedom to elect not to disclose documents and items he/she intends to 
rely on for the purposes of generating leads for new evidence.181 This implies that non-
disclosure of evidence on account of national security and confidentiality or for the purposes 
of protecting the source is generally allowed in instances where such source is used by the 
prosecutor to uncover new evidence that would otherwise be subject to evidentiary disclosure.  
 
Concerns and reservations about the Lubanga case among defence lawyers have centred on the 
fact that the prosecutor invoked Article (54(3) (e) to not only obtain new evidence but to also 
shield itself against the request to disclose the same. Vagueness and lack of clarity of this rule 
as well as the already established lack of strict stiffer penalties or accountability measures for 
disclosure violations have exacerbated problems and concerns of procedure orchestrated by the 
tension between disclosure and confidentiality. Perhaps the biggest motivation for non-
compliance with disclosure obligations under the guise of confidentiality is arguably the global 
burden placed on the prosecutor to try crimes and atrocities abhorred on a global scale. The 
prosecutor is not only duty bound to prosecute persons most responsible for crimes and 
atrocities, but is also expected to uphold and cherish justice and try cases fairly. This pressure 
is highly likely to incentivize them to take shelter on or hide behind these expectations under 
the pretext of sustaining the legitimacy and voracity of their indictments. 
 
As illustrated before, the structure of international courts and tribunals and particularly the ICC, 
opens it up to external interference. The horrifying and high-profile nature of the crimes 
handled by the court creates a palpably strong pressure for the prosecution to look for ways to 
secure convictions at all costs. It is notable however, that just as the pressure on the prosecution 
is high and on a global-scale, so is the need for the accused to defend themselves, plead their 
innocence and save their globally-damaged reputation. Allowing the prosecution to unfairly 
hide under the pressure of global scrutiny to deny an accused access to otherwise material 
information is arguably unjustified and procedurally twisted. If the evidence is favourable to 
the prosecution with a significantly higher chance of resulting in a conviction, then there would 
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be little incentive to suppress information favourable to an accused. Contrary to the popular 
rule that an offender is presumably innocent until and unless an opposite determination is made 
by a trial court; suppression of evidence is tantamount to an assumption of an accused’s guilt, 
and somehow unfairly pressures the accused to prove their innocence. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
As alluded to earlier, the establishment of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and other international 
tribunals is driven primarily by the global need to reign in on international crimes. They are 
aimed at giving assurance to the otherwise helpless victims that the powerful individuals most 
responsible for such crimes are never immune to justice. The Rome Statute that established the 
ICC for instance acknowledges the need to punish crimes. At the same time, the Statute 
cautiously acknowledges the importance of the individual due process rights of the accused, 
the doctrine of presumption of innocence as well as the right to fair trial. Unfortunately, the 
international pressure oftentimes misguides the prosecution into feeling like they owe it to the 
victims to secure convictions at all costs. 
 
These prosecutorial pressures, coupled by the general vagueness and ambiguity of rules of 
procedure and evidence as well as lack of sufficient accountability mechanisms and 
punishment for non-disclosure of evidence have emboldened the prosecution to overlook the 
innocence of the accused to drive what can only be described as activist prosecution agenda. 
Moreover, interpretations by the tribunals and trial chambers as to what constitutes exculpatory 
evidence have not made the situation any easier. Even in matters of confidentiality on account 
of safety and national security, very little clear, dependable, repeatable and replicable guidance 
have been made. As a consequence, applications for exceptions have to be presented on case-
by-case basis effectively dragging cases over long periods.  
 
The Lubanga and Ruto cases brought to the fore concerns about prosecutorial disclosure 
violations and advanced pertinent questions as to the application of rules both on confidentiality 
and disclosure. The argument has been that if the likelihood of securing conviction on account 
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of information otherwise held by the prosecution as confidential is so high, then there would 
be no harm in disclosing such evidence to an accused. Non-disclosure would thus be 
unnecessary given the inevitability of conviction. 
 
This Chapter has established that the struggle to balance the need for fair process and thus 
protection of an accused’s liberties with the need to protect witnesses and sources of 
information material to a case is not uniquely Kenyan and is one that is not only faced by the 
ICC but also confronted ICTY, ICTR and other criminal tribunals before them.  That most of 
these institutions handle this otherwise delicate balance on a global scale, and with global 
scrutiny and with much pressure to impress and remedy atrocities with wide-sweeping 
consequences further compounds the associated challenges as already demonstrated. The next 
chapter discusses the findings of the study, outlines the conclusions of the research and covers 
the recommendations the study deems would best help create a determinable balance between 
the right of an accused to exculpatory evidence and the need to shield witnesses from potential 
harm from such disclosures, both as important components of the fair trial liberties. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Anchored by a situational appraisal of Kenya’s criminal justice system that depicted a country 
grappling with a palpable imbalance between an accused’s absolute right to a fair trial and the 
need to protect witnesses from any apprehensible harm, this study set out to fulfil three 
objectives. First, it sought to establish the extent to which the existing legal, policy and 
regulatory framework on fair trial not only guarantees and protects the rights of an accused but 
also balances the same with the competing interests and rights of victims and witnesses. 
Secondly, the study endeavoured to determine whether there are relevant domestic and 
international jurisprudential guidelines on the right of an accused to exculpatory evidence that 
Kenya can adopt and standardize to effectively balance the competing rights of an accused, 
witnesses and victims. Thirdly the study underscored the measures that can be sustainably put 
in place to ensure the rights of an accused to fair trial is guaranteed without impugning the need 
to protect witnesses from potentially harmful evidentiary disclosures. 
 
The study operated under the hypothesis that: the existing legal and regulatory framework in 
Kenya as well as procedural guidelines on fair trial of criminal cases are inadequately equipped 
to effectively create a balance between the competing rights of victims, witnesses and their 
families with that of the accused to exculpatory evidence; and that non-disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence amounts to a fundamental violation of the right of the accused to fair 
trial. 
 
In a bid to effectively and comprehensively answer its research questions, meet its anchoring 
objectives and thoroughly test its foundational hypotheses, the study adopted a multipronged 
approach. First, it looked into the role of the prosecution in Kenya particularly with respect to 
the obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and also analysed the potential implications of 
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the same on the safety of victims and witnesses. This called for an interrogation of the 
foundational principles governing the right to fair trial and prosecution generally. The study 
thus probed the power dynamics between the state as represented by the prosecution and the 
accused with the view to understanding the implications of the same on evidentiary disclosure 
obligations. It also introduced and examined the concept of witness safety and confidentiality 
and explored the nuance of the same with prosecution’s evidentiary disclosure obligations and 
the eventual impact of such nuance on the right of an accused to a fair trial. 
 
Secondly, the study ventured beyond Kenya and explored global and universal principles on 
fair trial, witness safety and confidentiality and the role of the prosecution and the courts in 
guaranteeing both. It interrogated select rules of procedure of international tribunals, 
international court particularly the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC. It examined the role of the 
prosecutor in those tribunals to establish the extent to which the rules on disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, protection of witness safety, confidentiality impacted the right to fair 
trial and justice generally. 
 
Lastly, the study, content in the understanding of the application of the right to fair trial in the 
said international courts and tribunals, shifted to seek an understanding of the legal, policy and 
regulatory framework governing witness safety and the right to fair trial. This was undertaken 
with the view to not only determining the applicability of the same but also gauging their 
adequacy in safeguarding and guaranteeing the said rights. Accordingly, it looked at the 
international legal instruments ratified by Kenya that have not only become part of the local 
laws by virtue of Article 2 (6) of the Constitution but have also had tremendous influence on 
domestic legislation and policies on fair trial and witness safety. The study also underscored 
important fundamental global principles that nuance both the domestic and international 
instruments with the view to highlighting areas of strengths and weaknesses. 
 
This Chapter is therefore a culmination of the research into; an accused’s right to disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence the implication of witness safety and confidentiality on the right to fair 
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trial. It condenses the findings into simple coherent statements of finality reflective of the 
established norms. Accordingly, it not only summarily restates the findings of the study in 
respect of each of the tested research hypotheses but also expounds on the respective lessons 
and insights, and recommends adjustments, policy or otherwise, necessary to effectively 
address the shortcomings identified in the course of the study. It also proposes areas in need of 
further research or scholarly engagement. 
 
4.2 Adequacy of Legal Framework 
4.2.1 International instruments 
The study established that the right to fair trial as a concept is championed by both international 
and domestic legal and policy instruments. On the international front, the concept is advocated 
by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR); the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Torture 
Convention); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).   
 
The conventions and charters are unanimous on the general principles and specifics of the right 
to fair trial. All postulate that everyone has a right to an effective and expeditious remedy by 
competent courts and tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights and liberties granted 
to them by the law and the constitutions of the respective member states.  They prohibit 
subjection of individuals to arbitrary arrests, detention or exile and guarantee an accused’s right 
to fair trial. The instruments uniformly espouse that every individual is guaranteed a right to 
public, fair and impartial trial by an impartial and independent court, in the ascertainment of 
their obligations and rights as well as of charges against them. All persons against whom 
criminal accusations have been made and charges preferred, is entitled to be presumed 
innocent. Further, no one can be held or found guilty on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a crime, under international or national law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor can a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
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of the offending. In other words, no criminal law can apply retroactively and an accused has to 
be treated with dignity, respect and fairness as if they had not committed the crime for which 
they are charged, until it is established beyond a shadow of doubt that they indeed committed 
the alleged offence. 
 
Whereas these international and regional instruments on human rights and fundamental 
liberties are incredibly critical at establishing the fundamental principles upon which respective 
member states draw inspiration for their domestic legal frameworks, their enforcement and 
operationalization is primarily contingent on the political will and legal maturity of the 
respective member state. In essence, the otherwise noble intentions are reduced to mere 
guidelines applicable only at the whims of prevailing political leadership. Even in instances 
where enforcement mechanisms have been put in place at the international arena, such as the 
Rome Statue, the threshold is generally so high that they fail to capture the majority of prevalent 
violations. As demonstrated in cases from Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Kenya, Sudan and 
Congo, the involvement of international enforcement mechanism is extremely slow and 
focuses primarily on prosecution of individuals bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes 
leaving out many offenders otherwise deserving trials. 
 
Secondly, while the international instruments are fairly elaborate on what constitutes the right 
to fair trial and justice, they fail to provide specific and dependable definition of what amounts 
to justice. They also do not take into account considerations generally ancillary to any criminal 
trial processes. These include witness safety and confidentiality. Strict non-contextual 
implementation of the right to fair trial as per the postulations of these instruments demands 
full disclosure of evidence, both potentially inculpatory and exculpatory, in advance of trial. 
This inordinately ignores the possibility of reprisal of an accused and their sympathizers on 
any potential witnesses and victims, leaving entirely to the court, and without any guidance 
whatsoever, the discretion to determine the extent of disclosure. It is on this premise alone that 
this study concludes that the international and regional instruments governing the right to fair 
trial and justice are inadequately equipped at sufficiently proving guidance on the balance 
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between an accused’s right to full evidentiary disclosure and the need to guarantee witness 
safety and confidentiality in instances where full disclosure has a higher likelihood of reprisal.  
 
It is noteworthy however, that while changes in international instruments are advisable in light 
of the prevailing realities (increasing threat to witness safety), the process involved would make 
them excruciatingly slow. Even then, if would be incredibly arduous if not out-rightly 
impossible for the instruments to be exhaustive enough in capturing the balance between the 
right to fair trial and witness safety or confidentiality. This is fundamentally the purpose of 
domestic laws. 
 
4.2.2 Kenya’s legal framework 
The study also established that the domestic legal framework draws many parallels with the 
international framework in as far as the right to fair trial is concerned. In fact, the Constitution 
almost adopts the phrasing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) verbatim. 
This is no surprise as the same is universally the originator and foundation of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
 
The study determined that, besides the Constitution, the right to fair trial is promoted and 
safeguarded by the Criminal Procedure Code, Witness Protection Act and the Sexual Offences 
Act. Whereas the Criminal Procedure Code does not reinstate the fundamental liberties 
regarding the trial process and only provides a step by step process towards their realization 
from arrest of an accused to sentencing, the Witness Protection Act and Sexual Offences Act 
seek to promote justice by placing a limit on evidentiary disclosures in instances where the 
same is likely to occasion or threaten harm to a witness. Oftentimes, the harm or threats of 
harm are made primarily with the intention of intimidating witnesses into suppressing or 
changing their testimony.  
 
As already established, the Witness Protection Act not only makes important distinctive 
definitions but also outlines circumstances under which individuals can be enlisted for state 
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protection. It defines a witness to include any individual involved in a criminal proceeding, 
within or outside Kenya, by virtue of having made a statement or given or has agreed to provide 
evidence in relation to an offence and requires protection due to a perceived risk or threat. It 
empowers the court, on application by the prosecution, to issue orders effectively limiting full 
disclosure to the defence in instances where apprehension of threat or risk is real. 
 
Without adequate resources governing witness protection in Kenya, it would be difficult to 
guarantee justice and by extension, the right to fair trial. Only through credible, uninhibited or 
uninfluenced and truthful witness’ testimonies can offenders be booked and punished for 
criminal wrongdoing. Lack of adequate elaborate witness protection mechanisms would see 
many otherwise dependable and credible witnesses shy away from the criminal judicial process 
effectively subverting the course of justice and perpetuating the culture of impunity. Kenya has 
enacted the Witness Protection Act (WPA), but with limited resources its adequacy is still 
wanting.  
 
The study established that the legal framework is insufficient at guaranteeing the right to fair 
trial as well as witness protection. This is largely due to the fact that operationalization of the 
law is fundamentally dependent on political will. The study found out that since the government 
has not prioritized witness protection, an acute lack of funds has rendered the Witness 
Protection Agency incapable of handling the outpouring demands and references. Further, 
many otherwise deserving witnesses have shied away from the Agency and even failed to 
cooperate with the courts and the prosecution on account of apparent lack of independence of 
the Agency. This is especially due to the fact that the Agency’s leadership comprises the offices 
of the Attorney General, the Inspector General of Police and the Director of National 
Intelligence Service making it seem rather impartial and thus porous in criminal matters 
involving state officials and dangerous influential persons. Even then, these still points to an 
inadequacy of the law and the institutions established.  
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4.3 Non-disclosure and the right to a fair trial 
The study also set out to explore the extent non-disclosure violates an accused’s right to a fair 
trial. It operated on the hypothesis that non-disclosure of evidence, exculpatory or otherwise, 
infringes on the right to a fair trial. To test this hypothesis, the study not only looked into the 
evidentiary disclosure obligations of the prosecution in domestic, international court and 
tribunals but it also examined potential mitigating circumstances and intricacies and in 
particular, safety and confidentiality of witnesses. 
 
The research established that whereas all lawyers are superintended by strict legal and ethical 
rules of conduct, prosecutors are subject to even more stringent obligations. Unlike a private 
practitioners whose primary obligation is to be a zealous advocates and defender of the interest 
of their clients, prosecutors are strictly obligated to impartially and dispassionately pursue 
justice in addition to his/her role as advocates. After all, they are defenders, not of a single 
individual, but of the state and the society generally. With this responsibility come immense 
powers that far outstrip those enjoyed by other advocates and their clients. This creates a power 
imbalance between two adversaries that can only be mitigated by a strict set of rules and 
responsibilities. One such duty is to make full evidentiary disclosures. 
 
So strong and punitive are the evidentiary disclosure rules that a violation, as demonstrated by 
both domestic and international jurisprudence, entitles the defence to a relief and sometimes 
even a discharge. The study established that these rules have their foundation in ethics and law. 
Ethically, the limitations and obligations placed on the prosecution are meant to not only limit 
potential prosecutorial overreach but to also protect the integrity of the judicial process.  The 
prosecution is strictly required to ensure that all the relevant facts, including those favourable 
to an accused, are fairly, ethically and dispassionately presented before a court of law. 
Accordingly, a prosecutor is strictly directed to refrain from acts or omission that could lead to 
the trial and conviction of innocent persons. In law on the other hand, the heightened 
obligations of the prosecution beyond mere advocacy is to not only reduce the disparity of 
resources between the prosecution and the defence but to also ensure fair judicial process as 
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well as stem any potential abuse of power. A prosecutor’s duty is thus to seek justice and no 
less. In furtherance of this obligation, and in an obvious attempt to effectively alleviate the 
inherent inequities between the defence and the prosecution, the prosecution is expected to 
provide the defence with certain assistance. 
 
It was established however, that while the prosecution is strictly obligated to make full 
evidentiary disclosures in advance of trial, no such requirement is expected of the defence. At 
no time can the prosecution claim reciprocity of disclosure obligations. Domestic courts have 
in fact been particular that central to Kenya’s criminal trial procedure is the presumption of 
innocence of the accused as well as the constitutional deterrence of compulsion of the accused 
to provide evidence in proof of their innocence. The courts have held that the burden of proof 
invariably lies with prosecution and at no time does it shift. Arguing for reciprocity would 
effectively imply a shift of this burden and thus a demand that an accused, otherwise presumed 
innocent, adduce evidence as to their innocence or in counter of their presumed guilt. 
Furthermore, since nobody can under the laws arrest the Republic of Kenya and charge it with 
a criminal offence so that it would require it to be informed of the nature of the offence against 
it, the question of reciprocity of disclosure obligations or level playing field, are as unthinkable 
as they are misplaced. 
 
The study also found out that in the absence of a law specifically conferring powers on a court 
to compel an accused person to make evidentiary disclosures, no such order can be issued. 
Such approach would create a dangerous precedent and establish a rather false and misguided 
theory that what is convenient and would expedite the disposal of a matter is lawful. Such an 
attempt would amount to blatant abuse, disregard and limitation of the right of the accused to 
fair trial as espoused in Article 50 of the Constitution. The state is definitively the usual and 
obvious violator against whom protection is constitutionally sanctioned and it ought not to be 
allowed to claim the same privileges. Affirmatively therefore, there is not and there can be no 
question of reciprocal rights, or a level playing field or any such theory as between an accused 
person and the state. 
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There is however circumstances where the prosecution can with the leave of court fail to make 
full disclosures. The research established that one such circumstance is where full disclosure 
bears a higher likelihood of exposing witnesses to harm or threat of harm either from the 
accused or their associates and sympathizers. To seek further understanding on the applicability 
of this exception, the study looked at the practice in ICTY, ICTR and ICC. It established that 
the prosecution can be allowed to conceal the identity and confidentiality of witnesses. 
Domestically, the same is provided for under the Sexual Offence Act especially where minors 
are involved. The study found out that often the prosecution at the international tribunals hide 
behind the exceptions to not only frustrate the defence but to also create the impression that 
they have a water-tight case, even when that is not the case. Such incidences are abated by the 
fact the trial rules and procedures of the courts do not provide strict sanctions for failure of the 
prosecution to disclose evidence. Even in instances where such failure is established, the 
penalties are so weak to deter officers and the office of the prosecution is sanctioned 
collectively as opposed to individual prosecutors. 
 
International Criminal Court and Tribunals 
The study found out there is an ambiguity in the rules of procedure and evidence in the 
international criminal tribunals and the ICC. The accountability mechanism for punishment of 
non-disclosure is not sufficient therefore the likelihood of prosecutors overlooking rules of 
disclosure is very high. What entails exculpatory evidence is also rather unclear and 
determinations have been made on a case to case basis. 
   
Even in matters of confidentiality on account of safety of witnesses and witness security, very 
little guidance has been made; exceptions are decided on the merits of a case. This has caused 
the cases to go on for a longer period than anticipated. However in some of the decided cases 
prosecutors have been allowed to conceal the identities of these witnesses.    
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With the magnitude and global scrutiny of the cases handled at this level coupled with the large 
number of victims usually involved prosecutors are driven to try as much as possible to secure 
a conviction at the expense of the accused. 
  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
On the premise of the findings of the study, it is conclusive to surmise the following: 
First, whereas the international legal instruments and principles on the right to fair trial upon 
which the domestic legal framework draw inspiration are, at face value, adequate at promoting, 
protecting and upholding the right to fair trial and other fundamental human liberties, they are 
predominantly silent on matters and concerns antecedent or ancillary to fair trial and in 
particular, safety and confidentiality of witnesses. This inadequacy is by extension reflected on 
the domestic legislation and the Constitution. Furthermore, in leaving it to the courts to 
determine what amounts to justice or fair trial introduces the element of variance further 
affecting the dependability and replicability of the anchoring law. Parliament has sought to 
address this void through the enactment of the Witness Protection Act. Even then, the failure 
of the government to properly equip and fund programmes run by the Agency established under 
the Act (Witness Protection Agency) to not only implement it but also give meaning to witness 
protection are still indicative of weakness. On this premise alone, it is justifiable to conclude 
that the existing legal, regulatory, policy and institutional framework governing the right to fair 
trial is inadequately equipped at creating a balance between the right of accused with the safety 
and confidentiality of witnesses and victims of crime. 
 
Secondly, failure on the part of the prosecution to make evidentiary disclosures amounts to 
violation of an accused’s right to fair trial. Even worse is failure to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence. Violation of this obligation is evidently rife in the country and in the 
absence of clear and concise punitive legal and ethical sanctions for abuse, is likely to continue 
unabated. Strict adherence to this duty can only be feasible if the prosecution is held 
accountable. While the consequences of such non-disclosures are obvious, including vacation 
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of conviction and other remedies, the same are demonstrably not deterrent enough to 
prosecutors. Non-disclosure or partial disclosure is only allowable if the same is sanctioned by 
the trial court and only for the purposes of protecting witness safety and confidentiality. Care 
must however be taken not to allow the prosecution hide behind this exception to punish the 
defence or drive private malicious agenda. 
 
Thirdly, there is a consensus among scholars that the adversarial nature of criminal trial process 
oftentimes sparks emotions creating a wedge between the prosecution and the defence making 
it incredibly difficult for otherwise credible witnesses to confidently and coherently provide 
testimonies for fear of reprisal. Some of the procedural rules and principles meant to safeguard 
the right of an accused to fair trial are inherently adversarial in nature and generally tend to 
cause challenges in prosecution of certain offences such as murder, rape, robbery with violence 
and defilement. These principles include constitutional entitlement to bail; presumption of 
innocence; the rule on competency of witnesses; the standard and burden of proof; the rule on 
admissibility of hearsay evidence; the requirement that criminal proceedings be held in public 
and the courtroom set up; the passive role of a judge; the requirement that evidence should be 
adduced orally in examination-in-chief; and the right of the accused to cross-examine 
witnesses.  
 
In the interest of justice and pursuit of fair trial, there is an incredibly undeniable consensus 
among experts as demonstrated by the study that such adversarial approach must be tampered 
with an introspective evaluation of every trial process. Such a review would yield credence to 
otherwise important matters often ignored. These include witness safety and confidentiality 
and the likelihood of an accused to seek revenge or reprisal against witnesses. To this end, there 
is an undeniably deep understanding and unanimity that the rights of victims and witnesses to 
crimes are human rights and are thus as important as those of the accused and must be equally 
enforced in criminal proceedings. 
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4.5 Recommendations 
Based on the outcome of the study and the conclusions already highlighted, this research 
recommends as follows: 
a) An urgency for countrywide sensitization of investigators and the prosecution on their 
role in the trial process. The police and prosecutors need to be made to understand that 
their role is seldom to secure convictions at all costs but rather to help the court make 
informed decisions based on credible and ethically gathered and adduced evidence. The 
pressure to secure convictions has been established as the biggest motivator for blatant 
suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence.  
 
These aspects of police and prosecutorial conduct can be included in the police training 
curriculum and succinctly captured in both on-boarding and continuous on-job training 
of prosecutors. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) in Kenya in 
2018 established the Prosecutors Training Institute (PTI) to offer specialized 
prosecutorial training which is envisaged to enhance execution of the office’s mandate 
under Article 57 of the Constitution of Kenya. It would be a good step if the institute 
offers standardized training on areas of evidentiary disclosures especially exculpatory 
evidence. The institute can serve as a resource centre for prosecutors and other justice 
stakeholders. 
 
b) Both ethical and procedural rules on violation of prosecutorial disclosure obligations 
should be made as clear and concise as possible with specific punitive sanctions for 
violations to discourage deliberate, blatant and malicious infringement of the right to 
fair trial through suppression of material evidence. The punishments should be so 
severe as to disincentivize violation and prosecutors should bear individual 
responsibility. Only then will cases of malicious prosecution be reduced to an absolute 
minimum if not eliminated entirely.  
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c) There is also need to revitalize and strengthen the legal, policy and institutional 
framework governing the rights of both the accused and victims of crimes to fair trial. 
In particular, the Witness Protection Agency needs to be empowered both legally and 
financially through adequate funding to operate autonomously without undue external 
influence. There is a need to inspire confidence in the general population that the 
Agency is unlikely to be influenced by influential persons accused of crimes. Witnesses 
taken under the wings of the Agency must not only feel safe but also find peace in 
helping the cause of justice rather than feel guilty or threatened by their mere thought 
of it. While this endeavour could in application prove incredibly costly, it could be 
achieved through partnership with other organizations and entities. Protection 
programmes can progressively build cooperation with counties to help build trust and 
confidence.  
 
d) Judicial officers also need to be constantly made aware that their duty is to pursue 
justice dispassionately without pandering to the whims either of the witnesses, victims 
and their sympathizers or the accused. Through the Judiciary Training Institute (JTI) an 
introduction of continuous periodic trainings of judges and other judicial officers on the 
nuance between the right of accused to fair trial and the need to shield witnesses from 
harms likely to result from evidentiary disclosures should be fast-tracked, and 
especially in the wake of the Witness Protection Act. The Witness Protection Agency 
is a stakeholder at the institute therefore more needs to be done to ensure witness safety 
is a paramount consideration. The continued training on evidentiary issues and 
procedure would facilitate growth of jurisprudence and enhance performance of judicial 
duties promoting pursuit of juristic excellence.  
 
e) The rules of disclosure should provide that specific evidentiary requests by the defence 
be made over broad ones. This would save time and costs made for blanket applications 
for exculpatory evidence. It would also make it easier for the court to make 
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determinations as to whether rationales for withholding evidence qualify as exceptions 
to the general rule. This can be enforced as a judicial practice guideline.  
 
f) Statutory reforms should be taken into consideration for example the Evidence Act 
needs to be aligned with Constitution especially Article 50(2) (j) which covers the right 
of the accused to information which is held by the state. The reform could come in 
Chapter III (Part II), immediately after Section 63(3) of the Evidence Act which outlines 
issues of oral evidence.  
Secondly an amendment in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act to make 
witness protection a substantive provision rather than an in-passing proviso would be 
go a long way in solidifying witnesses protection. 
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